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Abstract 
Alexander Pope places antithetical terms in heroic couplets, emphasizing the 
relationship between opposing terms and holding them in a productive tension that 
prevents a misuse or perversion of each term. Such tension is made possible by the 
framework within which an antithesis exists: Nature serves as a whole that encompasses 
both parts, reinforcing the proper boundaries of each term but insisting on a relationship 
between them. Pope’s view of antithesis determined his stance on several key eighteenth 
century debates and was reflected in his taste in both poetry and gardening. The external 
antitheses he recognized and affirmed in nature were mirrored by internal antitheses in 
man’s being, particularly his reason and imagination. Pope affirmed the proper, tempered 
use of each half of an antithesis, and recognized that a harmony, rather than a synthesis, 
is cultivated by a perpetual antithetical relationship between them. His acceptance of 
paradoxical truths is reflected in his affirmation of antithetical ideas. The productive 
coexistence of such ideas, the harmony that results, and man’s inability to fully 
understand either through reason, all indicate the existence of mystery. 
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Introduction: “Order in Variety We See”: 
Pope, Antithesis, and “The World Harmoniously Confus’d” 
Alexander Pope (1688-1744), while best known for his poetry, believed, as he 
writes to Edward, the Earl of Oxford in 1724, that “Gardening . . . is nearer God’s own 
work than Poetry” (Sherburn II. 264) and is often considered as influential in the 
development of the landscape gardening movement of the early eighteenth century as he 
was in the cultivation of literary taste. In the latter half of his life, he tended his own 
garden at Twickenham, finding in it solace and inspiration for his poetry. Through letters, 
poetry, visits and extended stays with friends, and a steady stream of visitors through his 
own garden, he played an active role in designing the gardens of many of his friends and 
neighbors and in the dispersion of the principles of landscape gardening. Both his couplet 
writing and landscape gardening, while vastly different crafts, reflect Pope’s 
understanding of antithesis and paradox and the transcendent, mysterious truths at which 
they hint; man’s capacity to create and appreciate poetry and gardens in turn indicated to 
Pope antitheses within man and in his understanding of the world around him.  
The structure of the heroic couplet assisted Pope as he expressed his 
understanding of truth: it enabled him to posit opposing ideas as harmonious relationships 
and to affirm the tempered application of each. Even at the most basic level, the couplet 
is composed of contrasting pairs and opposites that work together in relationship: two 
metrically identical lines, each with five iambs consisting of an unaccented syllable 
followed by an accented, are juxtaposed and held together by a rhyme, yet the two lines 
are clearly separated by the line break, and the ten syllables divided by the caesura, or the 
smallest pause within a couplet. For example, in An Essay on Criticism (1711), Pope 
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writes of critics who praise writers more for the category into which they fall than for the 
quality of their work: “Some foreign writers, some our own despise; / The Ancients only, 
or the Moderns prize” (394-95).1 The caesura in each line of this couplet is clearly 
marked with a comma and falls exactly mid-point in the line: after five syllables. As a 
result, each line is neatly divided into two opposing parts: “foreign writers” are contrasted 
with local, and “Ancients” with “Moderns.” The distinctions between terms in each line 
are strengthened further by the parallel distinctions in the other line. The oppositions in 
both lines, however, serve the same purpose: to demonstrate the arbitrary and extreme 
allegiances sworn by critics. Each of the four parts of this couplet contains a single 
category of authors that, in the context of the entire couplet, is contrasted with those who 
are attentive to categories but concerned with a more nuanced approach to criticism. The 
rhyme further serves a dual purpose, both to maintain the unity of the couplet as a whole 
and to differentiate the lines: “despise” is the opposite of “prize.” The rhyme contributes 
to the contrast between the concepts, for, while the rhyme holds them in relationship, the 
definition of each term sets it in firm opposition to the other. Extreme reactions such as 
“despise” and “prize” to an entire group of authors reflect failure to consider each work 
as a whole, just as the fragments within the couplet, reinforced by the caesuras and the 
line break, stand in stark contrast to the whole.  
While the caesura serves to preserve distinctions, it also serves to emphasize each 
idea to the extent that the author believed it necessary to do so, thereby guaranteeing not 
only a sustained relationship between ideas but also an appropriate relationship between 
them. By manipulating the placement of this pause, couplet poets can shift the emphasis                                                         
1 Unless otherwise indicated, quotes are taken from the Twickenham edition of Pope’s 
works.  
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within a line, thus drawing a reader’s attention to certain phrases or concepts more so 
than others. For example, in the following set of couplets from his description of summer 
in his Pastorals (1709), Pope effectively shifts the placement of the caesura in the fourth 
line in order to emphasize the whole of the flourishing setting:  
Where-e’re you walk, cool Gales shall fan the Glade, 
Trees, where you sit, shall crowd into a Shade, 
Where’e’re you tread, the blushing Flow’rs shall rise, 
And all things flourish where you turn your Eyes. (lines 73-76) 
In the first three lines, Pope indicates a pause after the second foot and fourth syllable, the 
most typical caesura in couplet poetry, with a comma. Each pause, Piper writes of this 
passage, “is so sharply marked after the fourth syllable of each of the first three lines, 
indeed, that Pope’s shifting it to the fifth syllable in the fourth line helps him assert this 
line’s climactic force” (Heroic Couplet 7). Furthermore, Pope employs a feminine 
caesura after an unstressed syllable and breaks the pattern of the preceding lines, 
effectively causing his readers to “turn [their] Eyes” from the individual gales and trees to 
the landscape of “all things [that] flourish.” A similar movement has occurred in each 
line, as multiple gales have combined to cool a single glade and many individual trees 
together have formed a deeper shade than each one individually. The movement of the 
caesura from the fourth syllable to the fifth in the last line, then, echoes the smaller shifts 
that have taken place in the second half of earlier lines. The final line, with its feminine 
caesura, is a culmination of these earlier shifts. The overall effect of the whole scene is 
emphasized over the beauty of each individual part of the garden, but the contribution of 
each part is not diminished. By employing the heroic couplet, Pope is able to emphasize 
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the distinctions between each term and at the same time place them in a cooperative 
relationship. 
The tightly structured couplet2 confines each set of terms within a rigid 
framework, encouraging opposing terms to exert tension on each other.  Such tension is 
productive, as we will see, for it achieves a purpose outside of itself. Tension ensues 
when neither term is given precedence over the other and instead is held in perpetual 
relationship with its opposite. In The Oxford English Dictionary, tension is defined as 
“the conflict created by interplay of the constituent elements of a work of art” (def. 2d). 
The presence of opposing ideas in a work of art, much like the use of multiple poetic 
devices, causes a conflict that creates tension. For Pope, the parallelism of a couplet 
requires “setting up the strongest possible tensions and then balancing and confining 
them in the strongest way possible” (Parkin, Poetic Workmanship 66). Tensions underlie 
the structure of the couplet as well as the ideas Pope presents within his couplets, and 
Pope deliberately encourages tension in order to hold each term in place and maintain 
order, which is best achieved, he believed, through the juxtaposition of oppositions: “To 
establish such order in art—as well as in life or criticism—Pope attempts to mediate 
between or balance the potentially disintegrating opposing forces by maintaining a 
constant but equal tension between them” (Kallich 58). Even as Pope uses the breaks in 
his meter to emphasize one term over another, he does not give either undue prominence. 
Thus the tension each exerts is appropriate to its relationship to the other, and while the 
tension is “equal” insofar as it does not diminish either term and both terms must                                                         
2 In “Tension in Alexander Pope’s Poetry,” Rebecca Price Parkin notes that the regularity 
of the couplet, established through the rhythm, rhyme, and sometimes alliteration, creates 
anticipation and expectation in the reader, increasing tension. The form of Pope’s poetry 
cultivated tension as did the ideas he presented through his form.  
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contribute to it, such tension does permit a difference in emphasis when it brings the two 
terms into proper relationship.  
Antithesis is a culmination of the dual form and the parallel ideas within a 
couplet. Pope’s use of antithesis embodies his recognition that opposing ideas can both be 
encompassed and affirmed within a larger whole.3 Tension underlies productive 
antithetical relationships, enabling a stable coexistence of ideas. “An antithesis,” Bailey 
writes, “should never be a simple [single entity] but should guard the individualism of its 
parts as they share in the proposed relationship.” Because antithesis is “a productive 
tension of opposing forces” (439), distinctions are crucial. Antithesis emphasizes the fact 
that maintaining proper boundaries between terms is an essential safeguard of identity. 
Clear boundaries, in turn, enable the tension between terms, for an indefinite term exerts 
no pressure on its antithesis. Productive tension is contingent on the proper distinctions 
and boundaries between terms, which antithesis cultivates. Antithesis places two terms in 
a position that allows each to have its say—to express itself fully and exert a pull on the 
other.   
                                                        
3 In The Heroic Couplet, William Bowman Piper demonstrates how Pope emphasized the 
“extracouplet patterns of thought” to a greater extent as his career progressed. Pope 
continues to maintain the individual entity of each couplet, but, in his later works, he 
grows more focused on the relationships between couplets and the overarching ideas that 
connect them (129-30). A similar pattern seems to emerge in his gardening theory. As it 
developed throughout his correspondence and in his own garden at Twickenham, he grew 
to admire a more natural style with fewer rigid distinctions between the individual parts 
of a garden. He became increasingly critical of towering walls, exaggerated forms, and 
artificial plant shapes, all of which attracted the attention of a viewer to the individual 
elements rather than directing his eyes to the overarching landscape. Thus, while Pope’s 
earlier poetry and letters may differ somewhat from his later preferences, this paper will 
deal primarily with his taste later in his career when his ideas were most fully developed 
and exercised.  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By affirming antithetical ideas as simultaneously true, Pope presents paradoxes. 
Antithesis, Bailey writes, is for Pope “the ideal form for the display of the greatest 
paradox”: the paradox of man’s position as an individual working within a larger 
universe (443), a paradox reflected in man’s own work, particularly his artistic capacities 
as poet or critic. In his article, “Formalism and History: Binarism and the Anglophone 
Couplet,” J. Paul Hunter notes that eighteenth-century thinkers did not insist on a 
synthesis of antithetical terms; instead, they “seem to have been able to suspend opposing 
viewpoints—to keep them both in play—without choosing between them, and couplet 
poets . . . almost always asked them to do it” (116). If both terms are true, synthesis is not 
the goal, for synthesis intrinsically blurs boundaries and thus diminishes the expression of 
each idea individually. Failing to maintain the distinctions between terms increases the 
likelihood that, as the terms are synthesized, the synthesis will replace a duality with a 
unity or swing to an extreme and rely primarily on only one term. Because Pope 
recognizes the co-existence of antithetical terms and the paradoxical nature of truth, he 
does not choose between terms or merge them.  
Pope does not affirm the use of every type of antithesis, however. In Peri Bathous 
(1727), he describes “the Art of Sinking in Poetry,” an ironic inversion of Longinus’s On 
the Sublime. The work parodies “the influential Peri Hypsous, a guide to the high style,” 
by “converting praise of the sublime into mock-praise of the profound” (Rogers 631n). In 
the treatise, Pope satirically praises antithesis as a tactic employed only by those poets 
who strive to achieve a low style: “But for the variegation and confusion of objects, 
nothing is more useful than the Antithesis, or See-Saw, whereby contraries and 
oppositions are balanced in such a way, as to cause a reader to remain suspended between 
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them” (217). The problem here is the way in which antithesis is used. Authors who 
encourage “sinking in poetry” employ antithesis to create a “confusion of objects,” which 
is not harmonious. Although superficially balanced, these antitheses are balanced in 
“such a way” that discourages distinctions, synthesizes ideas, and renders harmony 
impossible. Readers suspend judgment not because each term is placed in proper 
relationship with its opposition but because each term remains vague and undefined. 
Suspension assumes the possibility of resolution; attempts to resolve the tension between 
antithetical terms, however, pervert the true nature of each term. Like a seesaw in motion, 
the suspension such a reader extends does not achieve true harmony. Instead, the reader 
swings from side to side, pausing only briefly, unable to maintain a steady position 
because of the improper relationship between the terms themselves. “Swinging” occurs 
between extremes, whereas a deliberate, tempered motion maintains the relationship 
between two terms that are opposites but not an extreme that perverts either term. In An 
Essay on Criticism, Pope advises critics to “[a]void extremes, and shun the fault of such, / 
Who are still pleased too little or too much” (185-86). Such critics swing from “too little” 
to “too much,” making excessive, wavering movements in order to affirm literary 
expressions that fail to maintain a harmonious tension. Healthy suspension sustains itself 
without denying the essence of either term. In the argument of the first epistle of Essay 
on Man (1733), Pope writes, “If I could flatter myself that this Essay has any merit, it is 
in steering between doctrines seemingly opposite” (7). The concept of “steering” implies 
that Pope deliberately moves between distinct terms; he remains in motion as he actively 
tempers extremes of doctrine. Properly posited antitheses require a firm stance in 
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affirmation of both sides; the middle way must be sought and maintained, for a reader 
will naturally tend toward a perversion of each idea.  
The coexistence of productive antitheses, in Pope’s view, creates harmony rather 
than synthesis or disunity, for each term is stabilized and tempered by its relationship to 
the other term. Harmony does not dissolve tension but is in fact contingent on it, a 
balance of discordant elements. In An Essay on Criticism, Pope posits many literary 
terms and ideas as oppositions, such as critics and poets, art and Nature, the ancients and 
moderns, or the rules and “nameless graces.” Within contiguous couplets, as within a 
landscape garden, there is much “stability and movement, unity and diversity, and, to use 
Pope’s words, order and variety” (Piper, Heroic Couplet 13), all of which become 
harmonious when viewed as a whole. Pope’s description of Eden in Windsor Forest 
(1713) reflects an underlying unity that acknowledges distinctions and demonstrates 
tension:  
The Groves of Eden, vanish’d now so long, 
Live in Description, and look green in Song: 
These, were my Breast inspir’d with equal Flame, 
Like them in Beauty, should be like in Fame. 
Here Hills and Vales, the Woodland and the Plain, 
Here Earth and Water seem to strive again, 
Not Chaos-like together crush’d and bruis’d, 
But as the World, harmoniously confus’d: 
Where Order in Variety we see, 
And where, tho’ all things differ, all agree. (7-16) 
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Pope recognizes the existence of tension in the prelapsarian world; when properly 
understood and expressed, then, it is not the consequence of sin and a corruption of 
harmony but rather a component of original creation and the source of harmony. When 
Pope places two antithetical terms in couplets, he places them in a relationship of 
productive tension of “Order and Variety” where “all things differ.” Thus he emphasizes 
the distinctions and the “harmonious” confusion that results. Pope’s conception of tension 
is intertwined with his understanding of unity in variety, of coexisting opposites exerting 
simultaneous pulls, or concordia discors, the “variety” he describes in Eden. Ronald 
Paulson equates such tension with concordia discors (Emblem and Expression 55), 
recognizing that tension is inescapable when opposites simultaneously thrive. Such 
tension is not chaotic, however, and Pope recognizes that despite distinctions, and within 
the framework of the garden, “all agree.” In the physical universe, as in his art, Pope is 
attentive to the harmony that results from the proper ordering and weighing of 
oppositions. 
 Pope’s vision of a “harmoniously confus’d” but chaos-free world reflects “the 
Augustan appeal to the traditional concept of concordia discors” wherein “harmony is 
simply a special condition of discordance” (Edwards, “Mighty Maze” 43) and also 
reflects a Christian understanding of harmony by affirming many seeming opposites: 
“Christians teach both God’s judgment and His mercy, His holiness and His love, His 
severity and His grace . . . [Christianity] takes two opposite extremes and exalts them 
both” (Veith 140). Pope incorporates both traditions as he makes use of antithesis to 
portray harmony. The couplet which closes the above passage, “Where Order in Variety 
we see, / And where, tho’ all things differ, all agree” (15-16), serves, according to Piper, 
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to demonstrate the classical idea of concordia discors, of “unity in diversity, of order in 
variety, of actual pattern in apparent chaos” (Heroic Couplet 145). In his article 
“Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony,” Leo Spitzer traces the idea to the 
Greeks who were the first to emphasize “harmony in discord, to see the triumph of 
‘symphony’ over the discordant voices” (415). Spitzer traces the etymology of the 
German word for harmony, Stimmung, which more fully expresses the traditional concept 
than does its derivatives in other languages, back to the Latin words temperamentum and 
consonantia (concordia): words that refer to “a harmonious state of mind” and 
encompass “what in ancient and medieval thought was woven together: the ideas of the 
‘well-tempered mixture’ and of the ‘harmonious consonance’” (413-14).  
Pope’s understanding of harmony also reflects his Catholic faith, and it is this 
framework of faith, rather than the author’s own, that will be assumed throughout this 
examination of Pope’s views on antithesis. 4 Empirical analysis will be valued in an                                                         
4 Pope leaves ample evidence of his Catholicism in his own correspondence. While the 
authorship of Essay on Man was still anonymous, Pope wrote a letter to John Caryll in 
October 1733 in which he discussed the anonymous author of the poem, defending him 
against charges of paganism. Pope insisted that tn the passage in question the author 
“proves him[self] quite Christian in his system, from Man up to Seraphim” (Sherburn 
III). He defends his own orthodoxy against accusations to the contrary. Similarly, in An 
Essay on Criticism, Pope writes that Erasmus “that great injur’d Name” is both “the 
Glory of Priesthood, and the Shame!” (693-94). Erasmus, Chester Chapin argues, 
influenced Pope more so than most other religious thinkers, and, despite the criticism 
Pope received even from his fellow Catholics for his praise of Erasmus, Pope again 
elevates Erasmus as “an apostle of moderation” (424) in his “First Satire of the Second 
Book of Horace”:  
 Papist or Protestant, or both between, 
 Like good Erasmus in an honest mean  
 In Moderation placing all my Glory, 
 While Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory. (63-68) 
In a letter to Swift, Pope explicitly aligns himself with Erasmus’s religious beliefs: “Yet 
am I of the Religion of Erasmus, a Catholick; so I live; so I shall die” (qtd. in Chapin 
424). Pope repeatedly affirmed his allegiance to the Catholic church and the Christian 
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especially prominent way in an effort to present Pope’s position5 rather than downplay 
the role divine revelation plays in human understanding. In Orthodoxy, G. K. Chesterton, 
speaking from the same Catholic foundation as Pope, describes the Christian 
understanding of paradox. He argues that “Christianity got over the difficulty of 
combining furious opposites, by keeping them both, and keeping them both furious” 
(Chesterton 249). Indistinct terms, or those that compromise boundaries, are “a mixture 
of two things” and a “dilution of two things; neither present in its full strength” (248); in 
contrast, the “furious” expression of one side of an antithesis is not weakened by 
compromise or synthesis but rather the truest and strongest representation of the term 
itself. Pope’s view of the paradoxical nature of truth and his simultaneous affirmation of 
oppositions is rooted in a Christian understanding of harmony, for while “paganism 
declared that virtue was in a balance; Christianity declared it was in a conflict: the 
collision of two passions apparently opposite” (Chesterton 247). In Pope’s view, the 
tension that results from such conflict contributes to harmony; the proper expression of 
each term—and its appropriate exertion of tension on the other as is true to its nature—
remains more important than a balanced affirmation of both terms. For, while the terms 
exist in productive relationships, the context of the whole does not always permit each 
equal emphasis. Balance, as an inescapable element of the couplet, remains crucial in 
Pope’s presentation of antitheses, but he seeks balance of a different nature: harmonious 
and attentive to distinctions rather than the merged result of synthesis. Just as the                                                         
faith, but, at the same time—as his admiration for Erasmus, the scholar who at once 
firmly adhered to both Catholic and classical ideas, demonstrates—he affirmed classical 
ideas and saw himself writing within the framework of the classical tradition.  
5 In The Imaginative World of Alexander Pope, Leopold Damrosch describes Pope’s 
“world of truth” as “empiricist, not Platonic” (291). 
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harmonious result achieved by Pope’s use of paradox “is itself paradoxical: motion in 
stance” (Parkin, Poetic Workmanship 66), so the integration of classical and Christian 
ideas about harmony creates a tension: “The harmonizing of the Christian with the older 
pagan view is in itself a kind of concordia discors” (Huntley 107), for, while both 
traditions acknowledge harmony in discord, concordia discors emphasizes a delicate 
balance between the terms while Christianity affirms a violent, productive clash.  
Pope’s couplets affirm the truth expressed through antithesis. But, just as he does 
not affirm every type of antithesis as equally valuable, he does not find the tension 
between every set of antitheses equally productive: a relationship between a term at its 
perversion, aside from revealing the unseemliness of the perversion, is not as productive 
as the relationship between two healthy, tempered terms. The juxtaposition of half of an 
antithesis with an untempered extreme still effectively emphasizes the proper relationship 
between the two terms, but the relationship is neither harmonious nor affirming. If one 
term in an antithetical relationship is merely an extreme expression of the other and thus 
contrary to nature—such as the dunces and hacks in An Essay on Man who are contrasted 
with authors who remain true to their nature, or the contrast between “false Learning” 
and “good Sense” in Essay on Criticism (25)—the tension between them does not 
productively create harmony. When “false Learning” is juxtaposed with “good Sense,” it 
is clearly seen as a perversion of “good Sense.” Pope affirms intellectual exercise that 
acknowledges limitation and does not overstep its own boundaries and take on an 
unfitting expression—in this case “good Sense”—as he criticizes its perversion. The 
tension between them reveals the unharmonious relationship rather than a productive 
harmony.  
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A familiar Christian paradox illustrates this well: Christianity affirms both fasting 
and feasting (Veith 140), but it despises starvation and gluttony. Fasting and feasting are 
antithetical opposites, exerting productive tension as a result of distinct boundaries; 
starvation, however, is a perversion of fasting, gluttony of eating. Chesterton writes that 
“all sane men can see that sanity is some kind of equilibrium; that one may be mad and 
eat too much, or mad and eat too little” (Orthodoxy 247). But, even as Chesterton 
recognizes that extremes that misuse the proper expression of an idea must somehow be 
balanced, he questions the nature of such balance. It affirms the tempered expression of 
antithetical ideas, but views the abuse of either antithesis as sin. The enjoyment found in 
food, and the pleasure a Christian receives from obediently sacrificing food in order to 
bring glory to God, are both healthy expressions of antithetical concepts and both reflect 
truth, but unhealthy expressions—while closer to the term they distort than it is to its 
antithesis—are the true dangers.  
 True harmony, when enabled by productive tensions between ideas, assumes a 
constant pull from each side of the antithesis, for each term is well-developed, but such 
balance does not assume a seesaw movement. When the antithetical terms Pope discusses 
are clear oppositions, he places them in a relationship of productive tension: such tension 
prevents the distortion of each term and positions it properly in the universe. Through the 
couplet form of his poetry and the landscape style of his gardens, then, Pope provides a 
framework wherein he affirms the productive co-existence of contradictory ideas; the 
tension between such ideas creates a harmony that reflects Pope’s view of truth, which is 
reflected in his taste in poetry and gardening, mirrored in man’s own being, and 
indicative of mystery.  
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Chapter One: “To Advantage Drest”: 
Nature as “The Source, and End, and Test of Art” 
By distinguishing the true expression of antithetical ideas from its perversions, 
Pope acknowledges a transcendent standard against which ideas are measured. In Epistle 
I of An Essay on Man, he argues that it is “absurd for any part” of man’s body or any 
element in the universe “to claim / To be another in this gen’ral frame” (263-64). But 
immediately after upholding the boundaries of individual parts, he insists that “[a]ll are 
but parts of one stupendous whole, / Whose body Nature is, and God the soul” (I.267-68). 
For Pope, Nature, as well as the wholeness it represents, serves as the framework that 
undergirds antithetical relationships. In the context of Nature, antitheses are tempered as 
tension is exerted from each term in its proper place. Pope sees Nature as a framework 
that brings order out of chaos; it is the standard that determines the proper expression of 
each of its elements and allows antithetical truths to co-exist. But, at the same time, 
Nature itself must be placed in its own context in relationship to God, the creator of 
Nature. In “Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony,” Leo Spitzer, echoing the 
ideas of Gregory of Nyssa in De hominis opificio, describes Nature as a reflection of the 
order and wholeness of God: “The soul informs the different organs like a musician 
eliciting different tones from different strings. The soul living in, and endowing with life, 
the whole of the body is the microcosmic analogy to the soul of God in the world; this is 
everywhere present as is shown by the all-binding, invisible harmony of the contrasting 
elements in this world” (424). God is distinct from the physical world, but as its Creator, 
he has endowed his creation with a unity that is reflective of who He is. Nature is the 
tangible expression of the beauty and order of its creator, encompassing the distinctions 
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between its parts in a harmonious way. It owes its integrity to God even as it provides a 
tangible suggestion of God’s integrity. Only in its proper relationship to God is Nature 
capable of its greatest glories—determining and maintaining boundaries, enabling 
productive tensions and cultivating harmony—and serving at once as “The Source, End, 
and Test of Art” (Essay on Criticism II. 73).   
At once a “Glimmering” and “Universal” Light 
Throughout Pope’s poems, Nature assumes many different functions: it serves as 
the standard or “heaven” from which both poets and critics “derive their light” (Essay on 
Criticism 13); it plants “the seeds of judgment in [men’s] minds” and “affords a 
glimmering light,” which ensures that boundary “lines, though touched but faintly, are 
drawn right” (20-22), and it “to all things fix’d the limits fit” (53); it is at once a “just 
Standard” and “Universal Light” (Essay on Man II. 69, 71); and it is “chang’d thro’ all, 
and yet in all the same” (I. 269). Pope’s use of one word to encompass multiple functions 
reflects the struggle to define Nature and describe its essence, as reflected in the multiple 
and sometimes contradictory definitions of the term. “Nature has, of course,” Arthur O. 
Lovejoy writes, “been the chief and the most pregnant word in the terminology of all the 
normative provinces of thought in the West,” particularly during the eighteenth century 
(69). In Pope’s day, conceptions of Nature were debatable not only because of its 
changing role in philosophical and religious explanations of man and the universe, but 
also because its paradoxical nature is inherently elusive to man’s understanding. Pope 
characteristically affirms multiple functions of Nature in ways that emphasize man’s 
limitations as well as the vastness of Nature itself. Nature’s multiple functions, according 
to Park, serve as the basis for many of the antitheses in An Essay on Criticism: “The 
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double image of framework and inspiration, of illumination and limitation, obviously 
suggests the central tensions and divisions in the poem: between critic and artist, 
judgment and wit, taste and genius, the rules and ‘a Grace beyond the Reach of Art’” 
(861). Ultimately, productive tension results from these divisions, for within the 
framework of Nature both are strengthened and thrive. By affirming Nature as the source 
of many antithetical concepts, Pope reveals the role of Nature in the cultivation of 
harmony. Nature as a whole provides a framework and inspiration to those who seek to 
imitate it; its parts illuminate the attributes of the whole, require the limitations of 
boundaries, and reflect man’s limitations. When Nature transcends its parts and inheres in 
them, both God’s transcendence and his immanence are evident in its paradoxical 
functions.  
Ideally, Nature plays many roles at once, as Pope’s interchanging of the 
definitions indicates. But when he employs the same term in multiple ways, he also 
recognizes Nature in its perversions and weaker expressions. The distinction between 
ideal Nature and incomplete and fallen Nature is the most significant in Pope’s 
interchanging of its definitions. Basil Willey, in The Eighteenth Century Background, 
notes a bifurcation in uses of the term:  
Perhaps the safest clue through this labyrinth is to bear in mind . . . the two 
fundamental senses of “Nature”: we may call them the “historical” and the 
“philosophical”. In the historical sense, Nature means “things as they now 
are or have become”, natura naturate; in the other sense, “things as they 
may become”, natura naturans. The “nature” of anything may be 
conceived either as its “original” state when fresh from the hands of God 
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and before it had acquired any “artificial” accretions, or as its final state, 
when it has attained the fullest development of which it is capable, and 
realized most perfectly its own inner principle. (205)  
The distinction Willey draws is evident throughout Pope’s works: natura naturans, or 
Nature in its perfect state, provides a “Universal light,” while natura naturate, or Nature 
given incomplete expression in its parts, serves as a “glimmering light.” But for Pope, the 
“original Creation” and the final perfected state of a being are one and the same, for 
perfection is determined by any created thing’s adherence to its original state. He sees a 
primary distinction not between the uncorrupted “source” and the perfected “end,” as 
does Willey, but rather between prelapsarian and postlapsarian Nature: between Nature as 
original creation, perfect and beyond man’s comprehension, and the Nature that is 
imprinted on men’s minds, accessible through reason, fallen and incomplete, but still a 
reflection of the greater Nature. In the lines already quoted in Windsor Forest, he draws 
this distinction: “The groves of Eden, vanished now so long, / Live in description, and 
look green in song” (7-8). The perfect garden no longer exists, but in human art—in 
“description” and “song”—glimpses of it live on. Later in the passage, Pope again 
distinguishes the original state of creation (“Here”) with its present state (“There”):  
Here waving Groves a checquer’d Scene display, 
And part admit and part exclude the Day; 
………………………………………….. 
There, interspers’d in Lawns and opening Glades,  
Thin Trees arise that shun each other’s Shades. (17-18, 21-22) 
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Unlike the ideal forest Pope described in his Pastorals, where trees work together to 
“crowd into a Shade” (74), and the groves of the original Eden, where trees work together 
to create a delightful mixture of sun and shade, these individual trees do not function as a 
whole. Rather than working together to create one shade—whether speckled or deep—
each tree shuns the purpose of every other. In its fallen state, then, the parts of Nature do 
not achieve perfect harmony as they once did and as they will again one day.  
Three of Lovejoy’s definitions in particular describe Pope’s usage. The first 
describes Pope’s concept of prelapsarian Nature, the manifestation of God’s 
characteristics: “Nature in general, i.e., the cosmical order as a whole, or a half-
personified power (natura naturans) manifested therein, as exemplar, of which the 
attributes or modes of working should characterize also human art” (72). The second 
suggests a Nature untouched by man but within his empirical understanding: “Nature as 
antithetic to man and his works; the part of empirical reality which has not been 
transformed (or corrupted) by human art; hence, the out-of-doors, ‘natural’ sights and 
sounds” (71). A third defines the point where these two come together: “Nature as the 
essence or Platonic Idea of a kind, imperfectly realized in empirical reality” (71). Tension 
exists in each conception of Nature, although its source differs: in the first, tension is a 
result of the limitations placed around each element of Nature and Nature herself—for 
Nature, Pope writes, characteristically juxtaposing two different functions of Nature and 
resolving them in a grander image of order, “is but restrain’d / By the same laws which 
first herself ordain’d” (Essay on Criticism 90-91)—limitations divinely designed. In the 
second, tensions reflect divine design and aid each part in adhering to its original state, 
but these tensions still serve primarily to temper and correct perversions that resulted 
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since the fall. The third is contingent on the first to maintain the second. Before the fall, a 
harmonious tension existed between all of the elements of the garden in their perfected 
states; after the fall, this harmony is closest to being restored when each half of an 
antithesis exerts on the other a tension that works to restore its original identity.   
The “Highest Pitch of Each”: Nature, Art, and Human Limitation 
In the second definition above, Lovejoy conceives of Nature as antithetical to art, 
and at times Pope clearly opposes the two. In his theories of both gardening and 
literature, he entered into the Augustan debate over whether art improves Nature or 
Nature is best expressed before channeled into Art by man, and characteristically 
affirmed the proper function of both. He believed that when men create art, imitating 
Nature and reflecting their Creator, they interact with both perfect and imperfect forms of 
Nature. Bogue recognizes that Pope strives towards both in his theory of gardening:  
[I]f Pope shares with his fellow Augustan gardeners the difficulty of 
determining whether Nature means for him “the sum of visible phenomena 
not made by artifice” or the “ideal form, theoretically achievable,” it might 
be because Pope believes, as did Renaissance theorists before him, that the 
ideal is knowable only through an observation of its imperfect 
embodiment in the real, and thus that gardeners must imitate both visible 
phenomena and ideal forms. (169) 
As a gardener and poet, Pope sought to reflect principles he believed existed in 
prelapsarian Nature. Ideally, as the “source” of art, Nature furnishes the material, both 
tangible and intangible, from which man creates; Nature is then realized in the harmony 
that is the “end” of art, and the transcendent standard of Nature serves as the “test” of art. 
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For Nature, Pope writes in the preface to his translation of The Iliad (1715), bestows 
creative ability on “all great geniuses” and “furnishes art with all her materials . . . for art 
is only like a prudent steward that lives on managing the riches of nature” (n. pag.). But 
Pope relied on the imperfect supply of materials—physical nature for gardening and 
language and poetic form for poetry—furnished by a fallen earth. He recognized the 
limitations of “visible phenomena,” and he also recognized the limitations of his own 
vision. While he believed that Nature serves as “the Source, End, and Test of Art,” he 
recognized that man’s limitations, and particularly the limitations of human reason, often 
prevent the perfect realization of Nature in art. Although in the overarching framework of 
things, Nature subsumes art, Nature must be kept in a productive relationship to art from 
man’s perspective because, first, art can make the ideals in prelapsarian nature more 
readily accessible despite man’s limited understanding, and second, the imposition of 
human reason can often serve as a corrective for fallen Nature. “Unerring Nature” is not 
contingent on art for its perfect existence, although man’s comprehension of it is aided by 
art. At the same time, Pope believed that fallen Nature, in the human conception of 
things, must be placed in a productive antithetical relationship with art.  
 The relationship between Nature and art that Pope envisions gives the fullest 
expression possible to both. In The Guardian 173, he writes that “it is no wrong 
observation that persons of genius, and those who are most capable of art, are always 
fond of Nature, as such are chiefly sensible, that all art consists in the imitation and study 
of Nature” (355). Those who cultivate sensitivity toward Nature are best able to create 
good art. The Newcastle General Magazine published “An Epistolary Description of the 
late Mr. Pope’s House and Gardens at Twickenham” in the January 1748 issue that 
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provides a description of Pope’s achievement of this relationship in his garden: “Nothing 
can excel the fine Views and Scenes about this great Town: Every Thing within the 
Compass of Art and Nature is carried to the highest Pitch: The Hills and Lawns, Woods 
and Fields, are cultivated and displayed to the utmost of Skill and Industry; and such a 
Multitude of elegant Seats and Villas rising on all Sides, amaze a new Spectator with 
their various Design and Grandeur” (237). From the viewer’s perspective, art and Nature 
work together to achieve the “highest Pitch” of each.  
 What sort of Nature Pope is discussing determines the interaction Nature has with 
art. The “ideal forms” of prelapsarian Nature must be systematized by the rules of art or 
the constructs of language; otherwise, they remain inaccessible to human comprehension. 
Such invisible forms are contingent on expression to be made visible, and thus imitate 
only by translating. The Nature that entails “visible phenomena,” corrupted by the fall 
and providing only a “glimmering light,” cannot be imitated in its entirety and thus 
requires dressing and covering as the artist observes human limitation. In the passage 
below from An Essay on Criticism, Pope describes the relationship between ideal Nature 
and art: 
 First follow NATURE, and your Judgment frame 
 By her just Standard, which is still the same: 
 Unerring Nature, still divinely bright, 
 One clear, unchang’d, and Universal Light, 
 Life, Force, and Beauty, must to all impart, 
 At once the Source, and End, and Test of Art. (69-74) 
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Life-imparting Nature creates beauty and serves as an absolute standard. Art receives its 
purpose and principles from the invisible Light: 
 Art from that Fund each just Supply provides, 
 Works without Show, and without Pomp presides: 
 In some fair Body thus th’ informing Soul 
 With Spirits feeds, with Vigour fills the whole, 
 Each Motion guides, and ev’ry Nerve sustains; 
 Itself unseen, but in th’ Effects, remains. (75-80) 
Nature is the framework that works through art, much like God works through Nature, as 
“th’ informing Soul,” providing inspiration and sustaining the parts. But just as the 
prelapsarian “Groves of Eden” live only in “description,” so intangible “Unerring 
Nature” is accessible to man only after it is given expression: it is in “Itself unseen” but 
remains in the “Effects”—or expression—of art.   
Reason and the Rules of Art: Nature Methodized 
In order to best reflect the ideal forms of Nature, imitations must systematize it, 
primarily through the rules of art. In An Essay on Criticism, Pope writes, “The rules of 
old discovered, not devised, / Are Nature still, but Nature methodized” (89-90). Nature 
on its own is properly ordered, but the rules of Nature “methodize” such order so that it 
becomes clear to man’s reason. Apart from rules, Nature, nebulous, immense, and 
transcendent, remains too detached from man’s understanding to be applied in art. The 
parameters of a couplet juxtapose ideas that simply coexist separately in Nature, but by 
placing them side by side in art, man is forced to accept both at once. Likewise, the rules 
of art reflect the elements of order, beauty, and system that are present in Nature but have 
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not been expressed, again confronting the human mind with them in ways that Nature 
does not. Thus, through the methodical placement of ideas that exist with greater distance 
between them in the vastness of Nature, the rules of art confront man’s reason with 
paradox.  
From man’s point of view, then, art is necessary to comprehend fundamental 
aspects of truth. Art exerts tension on and reveals at tension in Nature as it imposes a 
structure on ideas that are structured on too vast a scale for man. But Nature is still the 
source of art and exerts a tension as it “tests” the rule in order to determine how faithfully 
any set of rules reflects its source. In An Essay on Criticism, Pope affirms the rules of the 
ancients, who model the proper imitation of Nature: he urges poet and critic to “[l]earn 
hence for ancient rules a just esteem; / To copy Nature is to copy them” (139-40). But he 
finds fault with other sets of rules, for when they are misapplied, they obscure the truth 
from men’s minds rather than elucidate it. When such application is deliberate and stems 
from selfish motives, Pope finds it particularly dangerous. In An Essay on Criticism, Pope 
describes a contemporary controversy between apothecaries and physicians; the 
physicians sought a public dispensary but the apothecaries disagreed, primarily because it 
would disrupt their profitable business (Rogers 581n). Pope describes the results of such 
motives for rule-making:  
So modern ’pothecaries, taught the art 
By doctor’s bills to play the doctor’s part, 
Bold in the practice of mistaken rules, 
Prescribe, apply, and call their masters fools. (108-11) 
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Rules of this sort contradict Nature rather than making it more evident to human 
understanding. “Devised” rather than “discovered,” they reflect the human desire to 
overstep boundaries rather than “discover” them in Nature. Rules that are not made “but 
to promote their end” (147) coincide with Nature and further man’s understanding of it. 
Nature paradoxically remains the standard, though. In Epistle to Burlington (1731), Pope 
argues that gardeners should lay plans for gardens, using the materials furnished by 
Nature, and extract beauties from them, but to remember Nature as the source: 
  To build, to plant, whatever you intend, 
  To rear the Column, or the Arch to bend, 
  To swell the Terras, or to sink the Grot; 
  In all, let Nature never be forgot. (47-50) 
The rules clarify and systemize Nature, but they do so only when Nature is remembered. 
In The Figure in the Landscape, John Dixon Hunt writes that in this passage the “human, 
artificial activity (built, column, arch, terrace) is controlled always by a natural agency 
and idiom (plant, rear, bend, swell); yet both work in conjunction to the same end” (79). 
Human limitation necessitates a relationship between the two. In the following passage 
from An Essay on Man, Pope conflates the two terms, emphasizing at once the 
relationship between them and the limitations of human perspective:  
  All Nature is but Art unknown to thee; 
  All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see; 
  All Discord, Harmony, not understood; 
  All partial Evil, universal Good. (I.289-92) 
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Art makes Nature knowable to man; the rules of art, while reflective of something outside 
of themselves, are fully knowable by man. To God, Nature is fully known and to its 
Creator appears systematic and regulated. He sees the order, beauty, and method in 
Nature that man sees best in art. Thus Nature appears as art to God, as harmony in 
apparent discord, although such order often is invisible to man. 
The Landscape Garden as Art and Nature 
In his Epistle To Burlington, Pope praises the landscape garden of his friend, the 
Earl of Burlington, for it presents an ideal relationship between art and Nature. The 
inherent features of a landscape garden enable it to reflect this relationship more 
explicitly than other art forms. Bogue writes that “the garden has advantage over other art 
forms of imitating Nature in both form and matter. It is at once an imitation of Nature and 
Nature itself” (171), and Brewer describes the garden as a piece of a larger Nature and as 
a representation of it (621). Both functions require man’s involvement to some extent—
both to set apart a piece of Nature, much like a couplet sets apart and juxtaposes opposing 
ideas, and to create the representation wherein the orderly principles of Nature are 
displayed. Pope instructs the gardener at Burlington to uphold the or character of the 
existing landscape in order to best channel Nature into art: 
  He gains all points, who pleasingly confounds, 
  Surprizes, varies, and conceals the Bounds. 
  Consult the Genius of the Place in all; 
  That tells the Waters to rise or fall, 
  Or helps the ambitious Hill the heav’n to scale, 
  Or scoops in circling theatres the Vale, 
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  Calls in the Country, catches opening glades, 
  Joins willing woods, and varies shades from shades, 
  Now breaks or now directs, th’ intending Lines; 
  Plants as you plant, and, as you work, designs. (55-64) 
“Consult[ing] the Genius of the Place,” Ronald Paulson writes, “involves first a 
knowledge of the capabilities of the terrain, that is, its climate as well as its soil, from 
which its beauty and utility can be drawn out by the skillful gardener” (Breaking and 
Remaking 49). Nature, or the existing landscape itself, should guide a gardener in 
determining features that are fitting for a garden. As the gardener works to implement the 
principles he perceives in the landscape, Nature exerts itself back on his artistry: it 
“plants as [he] plant[s], and, as [he] work[s], designs,” creating, according to Paulson, a 
reciprocal relationship (50). The artificial ruin at the entrance to the grotto in Pope’s 
garden at Twickenham, which Oswald Spengler considers “the most astonishing 
bizarrerie ever perpetrated” (qtd. in Brownell 144), demonstrates the simultaneous pulls 
of art and Nature. In a letter to Ralph Allen in 1741, Pope writes that he has finished his 
grotto and that “now all that wants to the Completion of my Garden is the Frontispiece to 
it, of your rude Stones to build a sort of ruinous Arch at the Entry into it on the Garden 
side” (Sherburn IV. 343). Pope’s gardener John Serle, who wrote “A Plan of Mr. Pope’s 
Garden: As It Was Left at His Death: With a Plan and Perspective View of the Grotto” in 
1745, described the artificial ruin: “At the Entrance of the Grotto, next the Garden, are 
various sorts of Stones thrown promiscuously together, in imitation of an old Ruine; 
some full of Holes, others like Honey-combs, which came from Ralph Allen’s, Esq; at 
Widcomb near Bath” (qtd. in Brownell 144). Pope deliberately created a ruin and placed 
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it at the entrance of one of the places dearest to him in his garden. Regardless of the 
political implications of ruins found in landscape gardens at the time, Pope’s inclusion of 
an ancient ruin6 reflects the simultaneous tension exerted by art and Nature. Man first 
built the structure and created art from Nature; Nature, over time, has imposed itself back 
onto art: man has altered Nature and Nature in turn has altered the workings of man, so 
that what is left is worth emulating.  
A gardener who follows the “Genius of the Place” and maintains the proper 
relationship between art and Nature will “[call] in the country” and catch “opening 
glades.” One of the most significant developments of the landscape garden, the ha-ha, or 
“sunk fence or fosse” (Brownell 163), served to effectively “call in the country” 
surrounding the garden. The anonymous 1748 visitor to Twickenham described the 
appearance of the ha-ha in “Gardens, whose bounds are of an irregular Form, not 
encompassed with Walls, but Hedges” (238). By removing the walls common in earlier 
English gardens, landscape gardeners suggest that a visitor’s experience of beauty in a 
garden is not complete without a view of the surrounding landscape, which visibly 
situates the garden in the larger framework of Nature. In the late eighteenth century, 
Horace Walpole, in his On Modern Gardening, described the ha-ha as the “capital 
stroke” of the landscape garden (qtd. Brownell 211) because, Brownell continues, “while                                                         
6 In Alexander Pope: The Poet and The Landscape, Mavis Batey describes the satirical 
nature of many features of landscape gardens, for the statues of ancient artists and 
politicians maintained a “pristine condition,” whereas the “Temple of Modern Virtue” lay 
in ruins (107). Ruins often reflected the belief in the superiority of ancient ways of 
thinking over modern, but Pope’s use of the ruin better reflects his position on the 
relationship between Nature and art, as he otherwise tends to side with the ancients in 
matters of taste. Stephanie Ross expands on the political implications of the ruins in 
landscape gardens in “Ut Hortus Poesis—Gardening and Her Sister Arts in Eighteenth-
Century England” in the British Journal of Aesthetics 25.1 (Winter 1985): 18-19.  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permitting the boundaries of a garden to be concealed at the same time as they were 
preserved, the ‘ha-ha’ let into the garden the various views of surrounding countryside” 
(211). In Pope’s garden, boundaries are preserved as the parts of art and the whole of 
Nature are fused into one landscape. The parameters of the garden are maintained even as 
hedges hide the ditch that separates the garden from the surrounding scene of Nature. The 
relationship of the untouched countryside to the artistry of the garden provides the viewer 
with a greater appreciation for both, for “to call in the country, to conceal the boundaries 
of a garden,” Hunt writes, “allows the mind even further territory” (Figure 80). The 
physical juxtaposition of art and Nature enabled a productive tension between them—
allowing them to “relate freely”—in the broadened perspective of the viewer: “Walls 
could impose rigid constraints upon the entire garden layout by isolating the pictorial 
interplay of features within the garden and not allowing them to relate freely with the 
landscape outside” (Brownell 212).  
Aside from Burlington’s gardens at Chiswick and his own at Twickenham, Pope 
was influenced by and had fond affection for several other early landscape gardens, 
particularly William Lord Digby’s estate at Sherborne and the influences of William 
Kent, painter, architect, and protégé of Lord Burlington, on Lord Cobham’s Elysian 
Fields at Stowe. The ha-ha in its developing form was a key feature in both of these 
gardens. Early in the formation of his gardening taste, Pope wrote to Martha Blount as he 
enjoyed a visit at Sherborne. The beauty of the gardens, he writes, “rises from [their] 
Irregularity, for not only the Several parts of the Garden itself make the better Contraste 
by these sudden Rises, Falls, and Turns of ground; but the Views about it are lett in, & 
hang over the Walls, in very different figures and aspects” (II. 237). He continues, first 
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emphasizing the immediate view that “hangs over the walls” and then the distant view of 
the town and the broader landscape: “You come first out of the house into a green Walk 
of Standard Lymes with a hedge behind them that makes a Colonnade, thence into a little 
triangular wilderness, from whose Centre you see the town of Sherborne in a valley, 
interspersd with trees” (237). By drawing a distinction between the tidy walks of a garden 
and the small “wildernesses,” Pope notes the contrast between the “artificial” and 
“natural” elements of a garden, but insists that the landscape garden accommodates both. 
In the Epistle to Burlington, after describing the joint effort required from Nature and 
artist in the creation of a garden, Pope continues, “Nature shall join you, Time shall make 
it grow / A work to wonder at—perhaps a STOW” (69-70). According to F. W. Bateson 
in the Twickenham edition of the text, Pope visited Stowe just before writing the Epistle 
to Burlington. In August of 1731, Pope wrote to John Knight that “if any thing under 
Paradise could set me beyond all Earthly Cogitations; Stowe might do it” (III. 217). The 
ha-ha was such a prominent feature at Stowe that, according to Batey, “Walpole called 
Kent’s ha-ha, which followed the contours and united the garden and the countryside 
unobstrusively, a Kent-fence” (122). Kent was involved in the designing of Pope’s shell 
temple, and Pope once wrote of “the affection I bear him, and the respect I pay his 
genius” (Sherburn IV. 44). Horace Walpole describes Kent’s influence on the landscape 
gardening movement as a whole: “At that moment appeared Kent, painter enough to taste 
the charms of landscape, bold and opinionative enough to dare to dictate, and born with a 
genius to strike out a great system from the twilight of imperfect essays. He leaped the 
fence, and saw that all nature was a garden” (qtd. in Batey 98). The ha-ha served to 
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“conceal the bounds” and maintain the proper relationship between art and Nature, both 
central aims of Pope’s landscape garden.  
Because the main garden at Twickenham sat almost entirely on flat land when 
Pope first acquired the property, “there were really no commanding views of surrounding 
countryside from the garden” (Martin 49). The usefulness of a ha-ha, and the visual 
leaping of a fence to discover all of nature a garden, was contingent on a variety of 
elevations within a garden. Thus Pope went to work to create such variety, imposing 
manmade art on Nature in order to turn the minds of those who visited his garden more 
fully back on Nature itself. In 1720, he constructed a large mount at the eastern end of the 
Great Walk, and he later added two smaller mounts where the Great Walk entered the 
Bowling Green on the west side. A visitor to Twickenham in 1742 described the mounts: 
“‘A hillock on the right side’ surprised one ‘with an opening [prospect] to Richmond and 
a place or 2 more’” (qtd. in Martin 49). Although the large mount stood conspicuously 
above the land around it, its appearance was still far more “natural” than “artificial,” as 
the writer of the letter in The Newcastle General Magazine describes: “Among the 
hillocks . . . rises a Mount much higher than the rest, and is composed of more rude and 
indigested Materials; it is covered with Bushes and Trees of a wilder Growth, and more 
confused Order, rising as it were out of Clefts of Rocks, and Heaps of rugged and mossy 
Stones” (241). In addition to allowing the distant countryside into the landscape of the 
garden, the mounts, Martin notes, also enabled a more comprehensive view of the garden 
itself. They permitted a viewer to see the whole and thus comprehend the placement of 
the parts in relationship.  
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Pope arranged his gardens so that from an elevated viewpoint a visitor’s eyes 
followed a progression from the middle of the garden outward with a lovely intermixing 
of art and Nature throughout. According to the 1748 Newcastle visitor,  
The sides of the Court, or Parterre, are bounded by deep Thickets of Trees, 
Hedges, and various Evergreens and Shrubs, ascending into a wild, but 
delightful Slope, beginning with these of the humblest Growth, and 
gradually rising, ending with lofty Elms and other Forest Trees. . . . The 
Middle of the Garden approaches nearest to a Lawn or open Green, but is 
delightfully diversified with Banks and Hillocks; which are entirely 
cover’d with Thickets of Lawrel, Bay, Holly, and many other Evergreens 
and Shrubs, rising one above another in beautiful Slopes and 
Intermixtures, where Nature freely lays forth the branches, and disports 
uncontroul’d; except what may be entirely prun’d away for more Decency 
and Convenience to the surrounding Grass-plots. (238, 40-41) 
As the slopes progress away from the bowling green and toward the outskirts of the 
garden, the plants and trees grow thicker, working in conjunction with the ha-ha to set the 
garden apart from the landscape in a natural way. The anonymous visitor continues, 
“Near the Bounds of the Garden, the Trees unite themselves more closely together, and 
cover the Hedges with a thick Shade, which prevents all prying from without, and 
preserves the Privacy of the interior parts” (240). The garden remains a private place but 
the outside landscape is still visible to the viewer.  
Pope did not believe that a panoramic view of the entire landscape should present 
itself undisturbed to a garden visitor, however. With nothing in the foreground to disrupt 
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the viewer’s perspective, even when Nature might dictate otherwise, art is imposed too 
thoroughly on Nature. If what is in the foreground is over-systematized, then its capacity 
to reflect the larger nature in the background diminishes. At times, systemizing beauties 
in Nature diminish their true identity; in such cases, Pope insists, following Nature 
requires that the rules be transgressed: 
In prospects thus, some objects please our eyes, 
  Which out of nature’s common order rise, 
  The shapeless rock, or hanging precipice. 
  But though the Ancients thus their rules invade, 
  (As kings dispense with laws themselves have made) 
  Moderns, beware! Or if you must offend 
  Against the precept, ne’er transgress its end; 
  Let it be seldom, and compelled by need; 
  And have, at least, their precedent to plead. (Epistle to Burlington 158-66) 
Here Pope warns against “transgressing a precept’s end,” which is to reflect Nature, but 
imposing the rules too firmly denies Nature its truest expression. The same is true in 
poetry: 
 Some beauties yet no precepts can declare, 
 For there’s a happiness as well as care. 
 Music resembles poetry, in each 
 Are nameless graces which no methods teach, 
 And which a master-hand along can reach. (An Essay on Criticism 141-45) 
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“Nameless graces” cannot be captured without diminishing their purpose—hence their 
“namelessness”—but art can hint at them by breaking the rules or interrupting the 
landscape. Only within the stable framework of a couplet or a garden does a transgression 
of the rules cultivate rather than detract from beauty. In the passage above, Pope uses a 
triplet, breaking a pattern of couplets, to describe the nameless graces that “no methods 
teach.” The rules of a poem, like the elements of a garden, systemize what is inside to 
reflect the greater nature that is outside, but rule-breaking is sometimes necessary, 
dictated by Nature herself.  
Art and the Revealing and Concealing of Nature 
The features inside a garden serve to reflect and systematize what is outside, the 
whole landscape of which the garden is a part, just as a piece of art indicates an order and 
beauty beyond itself. Since the fall, the intangible elements of Nature—the transcendent 
principles that are not given expression in the material world—require systematizing 
before they are accessible to man; once given expression, the tangible aspects, as well as 
those that already exist materially, require covering, for man can no longer perceive the 
whole truth without overstepping his position as man and diminishing the very truth he 
seeks to understand. Since, as Pope recognizes, “’Tis but a part we see, and not a whole” 
(Essay on Man I.60), dressing fallen pieces of Nature reflects an acceptance of man’s 
limitations and at the same time better reflects the transcendent whole than does man’s 
limited glimpse of undressed Nature. Thus, while Nature in this sense is visible, it is 
visible only in part. In An Essay on Criticism, Pope reiterates the idea that “dressing” and 
“gilding” fallen Nature is a necessary function of artistic expression: 
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  But true expression, like th’ unchanging sun, 
  Clears, and improves whate’ver it shines upon, 
  It gilds all objects but alters none. 
  Expression is the dress of thought, and still 
  Appears more decent, as more suitable; 
  A vile conceit in pompous words expressed, 
  Is like a clown in regal purple dressed. (315-21) 
Art is to be reflective of Nature in its full state, which man’s mind cannot encompass. 
Thus art both “clears” and “improves” the parts of Nature that are readily graspable to 
man’s faculties and reflects the order of the entire framework of Nature, which cannot be 
immediately apparent to man. Artistic expression must “dress” thought in such a way that 
reflects an unchanging standard. “True expression” is considered “true” because of its 
connection to Nature. Bogue writes, “Expression improves by clarifying, but making 
things more what they are” (174). The relationship between art and Nature creates a 
tension, in part because of man’s inability to comprehend all of transcendent Nature, and 
such tension productively “gilds all objects but alters none.” The beauty becomes more 
evident to man’s perspective but Nature remains unchanged.  
Since the Fall, Nature requires dressing, but such clothing must further accentuate 
the beauty of “glimmering” Nature, as the rules do “Unerring” Nature, while revealing 
only in part: 
Poets like painters, thus, unskill’d to trace 
The naked Nature and the living Grace, 
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With Gold and Jewels cover ev’ry Part, 
And hide with Ornaments their Want of Art.  
True Wit is Nature to advantage drest, 
What oft was Thought but ne’er so well Exprest. (Essay on Criticism 293-
98) 
“Naked Nature,” as it exists materially, does not need systematizing to be seen but rather 
modesty to be appropriately covered. When held within the confines of art, Nature 
“appears more decent” and “more suitable,” just as antithesis, as Pope posits it in his 
couplets and hints in his gardening principles, is especially suited for containing the 
paradoxical truths of Nature. Art should not hide Nature with ornaments and excessive 
jewelry, or leave it entirely uncovered and inaccessible to human reason, but it should 
dress Nature to advantage, making it readily recognizable in men’s minds. Pope 
continues,  
Something, whose Truth convin’d at Sight we find, 
That gives us back the Image of our Mind: 
As Shades more sweetly recommend the Light, 
So modest Plainness sets off sprightly Wit: 
For Works may have more Wit than does ‘em good, 
As Bodies perish through Excess of Blood. (Essay on Criticism 299-304) 
Art that appropriately dresses Nature “gives . . . back the Image” that already exists in 
man’s mind. Pope’s description places emphasis on the visible, tangible image of Nature, 
which does not need to be ordered by principles that appeal to man’s reason. This image 
exists in man’s mind before it is given expression or translated into a rational system. 
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Although it is, since the fall, fallen and imperfect, this image still provides man with 
aspects of truth outside the realm of reason. It hearkens back to the mysterious elements 
of truth that the mind cannot encompass, yet it must work in conjunction with reason, as 
the “nameless graces” become visible only in the context of rules.  
While Pope draws a crucial distinction between reason and sight—between “What 
oft was Thought” and the “Image of our Mind”—he insists on keeping them in 
relationship. Systematized expression reflects back on an image that has not been 
expressed and serves to “more sweetly recommend” it; Nature is dressed to advantage 
through both intangible rules and tangible art, each reflecting a faculty of man, unique to 
his position in the universe, but fallen. In the passage in Epistle To Burlington where 
Pope describes the capacity of the Genius of the Place, he makes “the making of a garden 
and a poem . . . analogous acts” (Emblem, Paulson 49). The poet’s medium, language, 
primarily exercises the rational faculty while the gardener’s medium, the physical earth, 
primarily exercises man’s image-making faculty, but “both involve the human inability to 
create out of a whole cloth, by means of either mathematical ratios or the unaided 
imagination” (Paulson 50). The intertwining of the functions reflects the inability of 
either to conceive of the whole of truth. Thus art that receives its “Fund” from Nature 
reflects back on and gives expression to the image of Nature that inheres in man, hinting 
imperfectly at the Creator. To dress such truths is to recognize man’s limitations and 
ability to see only in part while simultaneously regaining the image hidden in his mind.  
Creation in its perfection was understandable and expressible by prelapsarian 
man, but, because of the limitations of man’s station, still only in part. Man walked with 
God and saw what God declared good—he saw the proper relationships between created 
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beings, peaceful relationships between greater and lesser creatures, a perfect relationship 
between man and wife—but understood only in part. His interaction with Nature—
especially evident when he named the lesser creatures—perfectly reflected his position; 
he expressed what he saw in language without misusing such language or overstepping 
his own boundaries. After the Fall, man experienced good and evil. E. M. W. Tillyard 
describes the perfection man once knew as “at once that of the Platonic Good and the 
Garden of Eden, while Adam’s fall from it is also the measure of the distance separating 
created things from their Platonic archetypes” (22). If opposites and clear boundaries 
existed before the fall and are good, perversions and blurred boundaries are evil and mark 
the distance between man’s fallen state and the ideal. After the fall, perhaps, man 
experienced not only a productive tension between antitheses but knew also the tension 
that results between half of an antithesis and its perversion. Enmity and bitterness 
between beasts and brothers, conflict between man and woman, and strife in man’s being 
replaced productive tensions that existed before the fall without the tendency toward 
perversions. After the fall, man’s attempt to cover himself served only to further reveal 
his sinfulness. While man’s purpose for clothing himself was to cover his shame, this 
clothing can perhaps be considered the first instance, although inadvertent, of human 
artistic expression, an attempt to cover his own nature, to impose manmade artifice on 
God’s creation. Man could not, on his own, properly dress his fallen nature while denying 
it. God, working through the transcendent principles of Nature, determined the proper 
covering for man’s sins and made provision for his fallenness as He dressed them 
himself, and now, in his art, man best observes his limitations when he traces such 
principles rather than attempts to dress Nature on his own. Man is susceptible to 
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perversions in his art and must constantly fight them by placing them in relationship with 
Nature.  
Since the fall, Nature is not accessible to man as it once was, just as after the fall 
man can no longer communicate directly with God apart from Christ. God’s clothing of 
man is a metaphor for the way Christ’s blood covers man; it is necessitated by man’s 
limitations and his sinfulness. Postlapsarian man can no longer comprehend truth fully, 
nor communicate directly with God, the perfect source of order and beauty, nor see the 
perfection of the original garden. Paul J. Griffiths describes man’s current state: “[O]ur 
desires have been removed from their proper arrangement, their properly harmonious 
response to the fact that we are created beings. After the Fall, we suffer from 
derangement” (n. pag.). Harmony is disrupted because man, in his pride, overstepped his 
position in the universe, desiring knowledge not becoming to him. Griffiths continues to 
describe postlapsarian man, suggesting two “apparently opposed meanings” of 
derangement, both of which clarify Pope’s view of the relationship between art and 
Nature: 
[Derangement] has its standard sense of removing arrangement, order, and 
beauty. But we might also use the word to mean an enclosing, a 
restricting—a limiting of what is properly a larger range. . . . 
Derangements in the direction of openness—as when our desires are set 
free to wander in an open range without limits—necessarily cause a 
second derangement, this time in the direction of discipline and enclosure. 
(n. pag.) 
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Thus, just as man’s body must be covered as a reflection of his sin and inability to stand 
naked before God of his own accord, so his artistic creations—the expressions of his 
fallen mind and body—can reveal only in part and must “clothe” or “enclose” Nature in 
order to best reflect it. “Dressing” keeps hidden what is beyond man and unfitting to his 
position in the universe. Such clothing of Nature through art takes the limitations of both 
artist and viewer into account. When men try to see or imitate Nature that is beyond their 
reach—beyond the imprint left on their fallen minds—they inevitably create a perversion 
of it, for men best comprehend the original form of Nature only when seeing in part. 
Because of man’s fallen state, then, art comes closest to the truest expression of Nature 
by dressing Nature. Man’s artistic expressions, as imitations of the work of the Creator, 
must be limited in the same way that man must be covered. The antithetical relationship 
between art and Nature, then, was necessitated by sin and the limitations of man’s 
perspective, as was clothing.  
In gardening, as in art, Pope recognizes, the key to the proper dressing of Nature 
is to create an “artful wildness” without revealing too much or hiding Nature entirely. 
Timon’s Villa, which Pope contrasts with Stowe, lacks this ideal in gardening: “No 
pleasing Intricacies intervene, / No artful wildness to perplex the scene” (Burlington 121-
22). Pope strives for an “artful wildness” in his work—a reflection of Nature that takes 
into account man’s limited understanding and need for art. In addition to concealing the 
bounds, a gardener should, Pope reminds Burlington as he praises him, “pleasingly 
confound” through surprise and variety (56). In a conversation with Joseph Spence, 
recorded by Spence in Observations, Anecdotes, and Characters, of Books and Men, 
Pope explains these principles: “All the rules of gardening are reducible to three heads: 
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the contrasts, the management of surprises, and the concealment of the bounds. ‘Pray, 
what is it you mean by the contrasts?’—‘The disposition of lights and shades.’ . . .  
‘Should not variety be one of the rules?’—‘Certainly, one of the chief; but that is 
included mostly in the contrasts. I have expressed them all, in two verses; (after my 
manner, in very little compass)” (299). Distinctions between parts, which cultivate 
contrasts, remain important, and Pope sees contrasts—the juxtaposition of opposites—as 
encompassing and cultivating variety. The co-existence of antitheses informs his 
gardening theory in much the same way as his poetry does, for he sees that true variety 
appreciates oppositions. Still, boundaries are not overemphasized to an extent where they 
seem artificial and each part elaborately dressed, so starkly drawn that they detract from 
the whole. The landscape, even with the “concealment of bounds,” provides a framework 
that permits surprises, such as a “shapeless rock” or “hanging precipice.” Viewers’ eyes 
are startled by something “pleasingly confounding” that differs from the rest of the 
garden in a noticeable—yet not overly ornamental—way.  
The proper dressing of Nature requires a right relationship of the whole to the 
individual parts within a garden, and the parts should, much like the rules of art, reveal 
truths about the larger framework without imposing on it. The relationship of parts to 
whole within a garden reflects the relationship of the work itself to the larger whole and 
is indicative of transcendent truths beyond both the created work and its creator. From 
man’s perspective, such truths are most evident when appropriately broken into parts and 
dressed. Such truths appear to man as a maze. In Epistle I of An Essay on Man, Pope 
likens all of the world to a garden, “A mighty maze! but not without a plan” (6). 
Landscape gardens create a maze-like experience for viewers as they move through the 
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garden. Paulson describes this maze-like effect as a primary distinction between formal 
gardens and the natural landscape garden at Stowe: 
The geometrical French garden was meant to be seen from the house or 
from a raised terrace on the garden’s axis; it was an extension of the house 
first as a view from it, then as a continuation of its coherent architectural 
structure, ordered like a periodic sentence with all its members 
subordinated to one end. The natural garden is more intimate and 
paratactic—one scene follows another, apparently unsubordinated but in 
fact clever juxtapositions. In this sort of structure, perhaps ultimately in 
extrapolation of the maze (a microcosm of the world as “mighty maze! but 
not without a plan”), the visitor lacks a sense of the whole and does not 
know exactly where he is in the total structure until he has reached the 
end. The general feeling of going down into, of being in and moving 
through. You do not know what is over the hill or around the bend until 
you see it.. . . (Emblem 22). 
A landscape garden consisted of a progression of scenes as a viewer made his way down 
the garden path. The juxtaposition of many smaller scenes within a garden, each one 
becoming visible only as a viewer leaves the previous scene, creates a maze-like 
progression through the garden, cultivating surprises. In a letter to Daniel Dering in 1724, 
Lord Perceval describes Cobham’s garden: 
The gardens by good contrivance of the walks, seem to be three times as 
large as they are. They contain but 28 acres, yet took us up to two hours. . . 
. You think 20 times you have no more to see and of a sudden find 
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yourself in some new garden or walk, as finis’d and adorn’d as that you 
left. Nothing is more irregular in the whole, nothing more regular in the 
parts, which totally differ the one from the other. . . . What adds to the 
bewty of this garden is, that it is not bounded by walls, but by a Ha-hah, 
which leaves you the sight of a bewtiful woody country, and makes you 
ignorant how far the high planted walks extend. (qtd. in Brownell 197) 
The individual parts of a garden are like the rules of art: they are fully systematized, for 
“nothing is more regular in the parts,” and comprehensible to man. Yet, at the same time, 
“nothing is more irregular in the whole.” The whole appears irregular both because man’s 
mind cannot comprehend the full orderliness of the Creator who sees all of Nature as art, 
and because the parts, by maintaining their distinctions, contribute to the whole in a way 
that is not fully evident to garden visitors as they wind through maze-like paths.  
Martin’s description of Pope’s “Great Walk” depicts the garden path as a 
“controlling element” amidst scenes of variety, serving, in much the same way as the 
framework of a poem, to unite the elements of the garden while cultivating appreciation 
for their distinctness:  
The walk provided the central east-west axis in the garden, logically one 
of the first priorities in the layout since it established the dominating axial 
symmetry that such a long and narrow garden needed as a controlling 
element. . . . What the Great Walk achieved was a dominant line along 
which or from which sections of the garden unfolded with startling 
variety. With the groves on both sides of the walk, and at either end of it, 
Pope emphasized the irregular and pictorial. (48) 
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A garden juxtaposes images that reflect a larger Nature in much the same way that Pope’s 
heroic couplets juxtapose systemized truths reflective of Nature. Paulson compares the 
individual scenes of a garden to individual couplets within a poem: “The garden scene, 
like the Popean couplet, is formally closed but open as a generator of allusions and as a 
participant in not always rational relationships with adjacent scenes (couplets)” (Emblem 
21). If a gardener has faithfully followed the “Genius of the Place,” the succession of 
views transcends man’s reason. Although both poet and gardener must achieve a proper 
relationship between whole and parts in order to best reflect Nature in art, their medium 
requires them to do so in slightly different ways, as Paulson notes: “While the couplet is a 
form that contains, or creates a tension with, the irrational materials it describes, the 
garden scene in its context embodies an imbalance in favour of the accidental and 
irrational. Whereas the closed couplet was Pope’s norm, the relatively unstructured larger 
natural expanse is the norm of each garden scene” (21). But, Martin continues, “the axis 
itself was broken—by groups of trees, a bowling green, a large mount perhaps for 
watching bowls, two lesser mounts, and urns and statues—into sections that followed 
each other in quick succession. As Horace Walpole put it, variety was added by ‘the 
retiring and again assembling shades’” (48). The garden path provides unity in diversity, 
and allows, as Pope writes in his Epistle to Burlington, “parts answering parts” to “slide 
into the whole” (66), but it is not contained at once in the viewer’s mind any more than 
the entire landscape is; it serves, as the garden itself does, to indicate something greater, 
more orderly and with greater variety, than itself. Walpole depicts Kent as a master at 
creating such interruptions: “Groups of trees broke too uniform of extensive a lawn, 
evergreens and woods were opposed to the glare of the champain [battlefield or open 
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plain], and where the view was less fortunate, or so much exposed as to be beheld at 
once, he blotted out some parts by thick shades, to divide it into variety, or to make the 
richest scene more enchanting by reserving it to a farther advance of the spectator’s step” 
(qtd. in Batey 98). Each surprise, which informs the mind of something new, further 
reveals the limitations of the mind and how much is still unknown. A landscape garden, 
then, constantly turns the visitor’s mind back to the whole of Nature even as it takes 
human limitation seriously. As the garden path winds through the garden, it permits a 
reader to see the same scene from several directions, encouraging multiple perspectives 
of the same view. These varying perspectives permit man to best approach an 
understanding of the whole. Even from elevated positions in the garden, the scene is 
disrupted by Nature’s own transgressions, reminding viewers of their inability to 
comprehend the whole. 
While Nature should “never be forgot” as its individual parts are given 
expression, it should be dressed as a “modest fair,” its parts decently hidden in order to 
cultivate the mysteriousness of Nature as a whole. The improper dressing of Nature 
reflects either a denial of its unity or variety: “The extremes of nakedness and ostentation 
in landscape design correspond to two possible distortions of Nature’s order, one through 
exaggeration of Nature’s unity, the other through exaggeration of its variety” (173). As 
Pope writes, “Tis one thing to be tricked up, and another not to be dress’d at all. 
Simplicity is the Mean between Ostentation and Rusticity” (“Introduction” to The Iliad). 
When neither overdressed nor bare, Nature is most fully expressed and best understood in 
a garden. “The dress metaphor,” Bogue writes, “apparently offers three possible forms in 
which Nature can be imitated: naked, elaborately ornamented, or modestly attired” (173). 
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Naked Nature is untouched by human hands; it remains a transcendent whole and does 
not permeate human artistic endeavors. Elaborately ornamented Nature, in contrast, 
emphasizes the parts to an extent that “nothing’s just or fit”; such parts are held in 
improper tensions which do not reflect proper relationships or boundaries between them. 
A few parts—those the artist most fully understands and feels most comfortable 
portraying—are emphasized at the expense of the whole. Each one is exaggerated, 
oversteps its place in the whole, and thus detracts from Nature. Such ornamentation of 
individual parts magnifies each, depicting it so largely that nothing mysterious about that 
single element remains. Elaborately ornamented Nature is dressed to an extent that it 
becomes unrecognizable in a chaos of parts. Modestly attired Nature, however, keeps 
parts in the proper relationship to the whole, clarifying Nature in such a way that it “gives 
us back the Image of our Mind.”  
For example, Homer achieves an “artful wildness” in The Iliad, as Pope describes 
in the preface to his translation: “As in the most regular Gardens, Art can only reduce the 
beauties of Nature to more regularity, and such a Figure as the common Eye may better 
take in . . . [Homer’s] Work is a wild Paradise, where if we cannot see all the Beauties so 
distinctly as in an order’d Garden, it is only because the Number of them is infinitely 
greater” (n. pag.). Homer is perhaps more able to “conceal the bounds” and reveal 
beauties as less distinct yet “infinitely greater” than many other poets. He provides an 
example of Pope’s rules of gardening on an exaggerated scale, which makes them more 
understandable. In Homer’s work, many parts, creating much harmonious tension, are 
presented to an extent where the view of the whole diminishes the distinctions of the 
parts—although they are still there, ensuring variety. Because “we cannot see all the 
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Beauties so distinctly,” the beauty of the whole subsumes them all. In An Essay on 
Criticism, Pope writes that in Nature 
  . . . what affects our Hearts 
  Is not th’ Exactness of peculiar Parts; 
  ‘Tis not a Lip, or Eye, we Beauty call, 
  But the joint Force and full Result of all. 
  Thus when we view some well-proportion’d Dome, 
  (The World’s just Wonder, and ev’n thine O Rome!) (243-48) 
When each part is “well-proportion’d” and exerting a “joint Force” in relationship to 
every other, it is most fully expressed and the greatest harmony results, and, 
paradoxically, the parts become less distinct within the whole. Homer cultivates such 
wholeness through the “artful wildness” of his works and the end result is “at once . . . 
Bold, and Regular”: 
  No single Parts unequally surprize; 
  All comes united to th’admiring Eyes; 
  No monstrous Height, or Breadth, or Length appear; 
  The Whole at once is Bold, and Regular. (249-52) 
With a proper relationship of parts to whole, Homer’s works, Pope argues, were 
“modestly attired.” 
In The Epistle to Burlington, Pope contrasts Timon’s Villa to Stowe, for Timon 
does not maintain the proper relationship between art and Nature or the parts and the 
whole in his garden, unlike the garden at Stowe. Like the formal French gardens of 
Pope’s day, Timon’s garden was separated from the surrounding landscape with high 
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walls: “His Gardens next your admiration call, / On ev’ry side you look, behold the 
Wall!” (114-15). Inside the garden, art is imposed on Nature in much the same way: 
“Grove nods at grove, each Alley has a brother, / And half the platform just reflects the 
other” (118-19). Symmetry is not reflective of the “Genius of the Place” but instead is 
fully accommodated by human reason. According to Bogue, “The French formal garden 
is eminently ordered, but it is that of man’s limited mind, of a Nature reduced to the level 
of human weakness” (172). Pope’s poetry, despite its formal couplets, corresponds more 
fully with those gardeners who “follow Nature,” for he does the same thing with slight-
rhymes as gardeners do with the ideas already present in Nature: he insists that perfect 
parallelism is not necessary but rather an antithetical framework that holds the two in 
relationship. The two in coexistence, like the variety in a garden, affirms transcendent 
truths beyond man. Man’s response to art should recognize that man’s proper field is in 
the systemizing of the parts, not the over-systematizing of the whole by imposing 
symmetry. Timon, in contrast, over-systematizes. He likewise alters plants and trees, 
creating topiaries, until they lose their identity: “The suff’ring eye inverted Nature sees, / 
Trees cut to Statues thick as trees” (120-21). In the Spectator 173, Pope criticizes the 
unnaturalness of this practice:  
How contrary to this Simplicity is the modern Practice of Gardening; we 
seem to make it our Study to recede from Nature, not only in the various 
Tonsure of Greens into the most regular and formal shapes, but even in 
monstrous Attempts beyond the reach of art itself; We run into Sculpture, 
and are better pleas’d to have our Trees in the most awkward Figures of 
Men and Animals than in the most regular of their own. (n. pag.) 
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As he “recedes from Nature” and imposes artifice on his garden, Timon also presents to 
his visitors the whole of the Nature:  
So proud, so grand, of that stupendous air, 
Soft and Agreeable come never there. 
Greatness, with Timon, dwells in such a draught 
As brings all Brobdignag before your throught.  
To compass this, his building is a Town, 
His pond an Ocean, his parterre a Down: 
Who but must laugh, the Master when he sees, 
A puny insect, shiv’ring at a breeze!  (Burlington 103-09) 
In his pride, Timon attempts to put too much in man’s reach: he brings “all Brobdingnag 
before your thought” and presents the sublime beauties of an Ocean-like pond and entire 
town rather than those more fitting to his Villa. He fails to maintain a proper relationship 
between whole and parts or between art and Nature.  
Although expressed differently, the same principles formed the foundation for 
Pope’s gardening as his literary art: his seemingly artificial form in his poetry serves as 
the best expression of Pope’s view of Nature. Willey notes that from the nineteenth 
century onward, Pope has been regarded as “the chief exemplar of an ‘artificial’ poetry” 
(27), for his antithetical lines seem deliberate and contrived, constricted within the 
confines of a couplet, rather than “natural” and uninhibited by form. But G. K. Chesterton 
disagrees, noting that the structure of Pope’s poetry is reflective of his understanding of 
truth and best gives expression to the harmonious paradoxes he recognizes in the universe 
and in man: “Certainly antithesis is not artificial. An element of paradox runs through the 
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whole of existence itself. . . . If Pope and his followers caught this echo of natural 
irrationality, they were not any the more artificial. Their antitheses were fully in harmony 
with existence, which is itself a contradiction in terms” (“Art of Satire” 583). Pope 
believed that heroic couplets properly “dress” paradoxes by juxtaposing opposing ideas 
so that man can comprehend them at once. Both ideas are affirmed, if appropriate, but 
they remain paradoxical and the relationship between them is no more accessible than it 
was when the terms remained abstract in Nature. Couplets merely insist that such a 
relationship is there; man must confront it and accommodate the paradoxical ideas in his 
understanding of truth. Similarly, a garden confines within a narrow piece of Nature the 
transcendent truths at which all of Nature hints, making them more visible to man 
without diminishing their beauty. When antitheses are working properly, they reproduce 
or represent what is natural even as they transcend man’s full understanding. Antithesis in 
both gardens and poetry, Pope believed, best reflects paradox.  
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Chapter Two:  
Mercurial Man: “All Subsists By Elemental Strife” 
In The Spectator No. 408, Pope describes the human condition: “As Nature has 
framed the several Species of Beings as it were in a Chain, so Man seems to be placed as 
the middle Link between Angels and Brutes: Hence he participates both of Flesh and 
Spirit by an Admirable Tie, which in him occasions perpetual War of Passions” (16). 
Because of man’s middle nature on the Great Chain of Being, Pope saw two natures at 
war within him: flesh and spirit. The “admirable tie” which holds them in relationship, 
Pope believed, creates a “perpetual war,” much like the opposing ideas that are placed in 
relationship within a single couplet. In An Essay on Man, Pope describes the paradoxical 
state of man as a result of his “middle state”: 
  He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest, 
  In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast; 
  In doubt his mind or body to prefer, 
  Born but to die, and reasoning but to err; (II.7-10) 
In this passage, Pope describes the many tensions that exist within man, tensions between 
the godlike and animal aspects of his nature, between his mind and body, and between his 
thoughts and passions. As he “hangs between” the antithetical aspects of his being, chaos 
ensues: 
  Chaos of thought and passion, all confused; 
  Still by himself abused, or disabused; 
  Created half to rise, and half to fall; 
  Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all; (II.13-16) 
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Man’s “doubt” over which part of his own nature “to prefer” causes confusion as he tries 
to act; the proper relationships between the elements of his being are likewise “all 
confused.”  
Yet, man should embrace the tension between the different elements of his being. 
In the first epistle of Essay on Man, Pope writes, 
 Better for Us, perhaps, it might appear, 
 Were there all harmony, all virtue here; 
 That never air or ocean felt the wind; 
 That never passion discompos’d the mind: 
 But ALL subsists by elemental strife; 
 And passions are the elements of Life. 
 The gen’ral ORDER, since the world began, 
 Is kept in Nature, and is kept in Man. (I.165-72) 
Men may presume to think that a superficial harmony that downplays distinctions and 
discourages tension is a preferable state. This sort of harmony, however, only appears to 
be a better state, for it denies the true nature of man. Man, like all other beings, “subsists 
by elemental strife.” To deny such strife is contrary to the order God has instituted 
through Nature. The unity in diversity and order in variety that enable Nature to function 
properly is reflected in man’s being. Order is kept in man as it is kept in Nature through 
recognition of the larger framework that honors distinctions and necessitates tension. 
Man does not achieve true harmony by permitting each of the contradictory 
elements of his being equal preference. Rather, each part within man, like each being in 
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the Great Chain of Being, should exert tension as is fitting for its position in relationship 
to all others: 
  The less, or greater, set so justly true, 
  That touching one must strike the other too; 
  ’Till jarring int’rests of themselves create 
  Th’according music of a well-mix’d State. (Essay on Man III.291-94) 
The positioning of both the “less” and the “greater” is fitting for each, and thus “justly 
true,” and if a being in either position oversteps its proper bounds, it affects every other. 
The “jarring int’rests” of each individual being in its proper place in the universe, in 
contrast, ultimately create a “well-mix’d State” that is musical and harmonious:  
  Such is the World’s great harmony, that springs 
  From Order, Union, full Consent of things! 
  Where small and great, where weak and mighty, made 
  To serve, not suffer, strengthen, not invade, 
  More pow’rful each as needful to the rest, 
  And, in proportion as it blesses, blest, (III.295-300) 
Here Pope emphasizes the relationships between each level of the Great Chain, 
relationships that ultimately hold the chain together as a single entity. Harmony stems 
from the “full Consent” of each to its position. Consent includes exerting a tension as is 
fitting to one’s proper place and enables “great and small,” “weak and mighty” to 
“serve,” “strengthen,” and “bless” every other. Such tension is thus productive, for it 
cultivates the distinctions between beings and benefits them all. The harmony that is 
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cultivated through tension when antithetical ideas are held in relationship by Nature is 
also cultivated in men when antithetical aspects of man’s being are held together.  
Ideal Man: “Strong Grows the Virtue with His Nature Mixed”  
In Epistle II of An Essay on Man, Pope writes that the “best principle” of man is 
his capacity to place the otherwise shifting elements of his nature into a fixed 
relationship: “’Tis thus the mercury of Man is fixed, / Strong grows the virtue with his 
nature mixed” (II. 176-78). Man’s virtue increases as a result of the tensions within his 
own nature, for a stable relationship between his body and soul productively situates 
each: “The dross cements what else were too refined, / And in one interest body acts with 
mind” (179-80). Thus when man acts with a unified nature, he acts as is fitting for man: 
the elements of his nature remain distinct and the identity of both mind and body is 
preserved, exerting contrary pulls but acting as one. When he describes man’s ideal 
nature, Pope conceives of “mercury,” as Pat Rogers notes, in a positive sense, although 
he would have been familiar with the susceptibility of its inconstant nature:  
All metals were supposed to be based on a primal constituent of mercury; 
the word ‘mercury’ also carries the sense of elusiveness, capriciousness. In 
combination with the word ‘virtue’ in the next line, however, there is a 
clear additional reference to alchemy; this would provide the sense, ‘thus, 
by the alchemy of Providence, a mysterious harmony is achieved in the 
life of the passions.’ (648n)  
“Strength of mind,” Pope writes, “is Exercise, not rest” (II.104). When body and mind act 
in one interest, a deliberate motion ensues. As we saw in the introduction, “steering” 
rather than “swinging” between the two halves of an antithesis enables productivity or 
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virtue. Thus, exercise is required, for steering necessitates activity and discourages a 
passivity that permits the mind to be pulled too sharply and swing from one extreme or 
another. When man cultivates a productive tension between the elements of his being, he 
channels conflicting passions into a single action that does not over- or under-indulge any 
of them. Pope continues,  
 Passions, like Elements, tho’ born to fight, 
 Yet, mix’d and soften’d, in his work unite, 
 These ’tis enough to temper and employ; 
 But what composes Man, can Man destroy? (II.111-14) 
Pope recognizes the contentious potential of the elements, but when they are held in 
relationship and “mix’d” in man’s being, they are also “soften’d” so that man can steer 
between them. If man will actively “employ” his passions, he will preserve them in 
tempered expressions. He will not deny or favor any one element of his being beyond 
what is fitting. Ideally, man permits both natures that comprise his “middle” nature full 
expression in his being, cultivating productive tension between them.  
 Man can respond to his position in the universe either through acceptance or 
denial of his true nature. Examples of improper responses can be seen in many of Pope’s 
descriptions of women. Pope had a fond affection for women, and he believed they 
possessed the greatest capacity to integrate their two natures and thus were also most 
affected by a failure to integrate the two. Depicting the inconstant character of women, he 
believed, enabled him to magnify mankind’s innate tendency toward extremes, much like 
his description of Homer’s works allowed him to present the ideal, although magnified, 
relationship between Nature and art. In a footnote to An Epistle to a Lady, which he 
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dedicated to Martha Blount, he writes that the “particular characters” of women “are not 
so strongly marked as those of men, seldom so fixed, and still more inconsistent with 
themselves” (46n). After depicting many such “variegated tulips” (line 41), he presents 
“the picture of an estimable woman, with the best kind of contrarieties” (72n). Such a 
woman does not deny the struggle within her nature or seek to escape from tension; 
rather, she is at her best when she accepts both the godlike and the animal-like aspects of 
her being and permits each its proper place. Thus, while she remains a “contradiction” 
much like the other women, the contrarieties within her nature cultivate tension and 
elevate her: “And yet, believe me, good as well as ill, / Woman’s at best a contradiction 
still” (269-79). Pope describes her at her best:  
  Reserve with frankness, art with truth allied, 
  Courage with softness, modesty with pride, 
  Fixed principles, with fancy ever new; 
  Shakes all together, and produces—You. (277-80) 
Contradictions co-exist within the woman Pope addresses: softness complements courage 
just as modesty does pride. In her exists, Mack notes, “the notion of a harmony achieved 
from things and forces disparate or conflicting, a concordia discors” (A Life 634). This 
woman possesses such contrarieties simultaneously, which serves to temper otherwise 
severe qualities and in turn enables her to assume her proper place above the beasts but 
beneath the angels.  
Perversions of the Ideal: “Created Half to Rise and Half to Fall” 
 Man’s denial of his true nature can take several forms, for he can deny either the 
lower or higher aspect of his being, or distort the relationship between them. In An Essay 
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on Man, Pope describes man’s condition as a “being darkly wise, and rudely great” (II.4). 
His wisdom is tainted with darkness, his greatness intertwined with the ruder elements of 
his being. As we saw in the passage quoted above, such confliction in his being renders 
action difficult: 
  With too much knowledge for the Skeptic side, 
  With too much weakness for the Stoic’s pride, 
  He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest, 
  In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast; (5-8) 
Man “hangs between” his godlike and animal natures, sometimes paralyzed by the 
limitations of each: “In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer, / Born but to die, and reas’ning 
but to err” (9-10). When men seek to “prefer” one part of their being to another, they are 
confronted more severely with the limitations of each: they know acutely that the body is 
“born but to die” and the “reas’ning but to err.” When, rather than give preference to one, 
man accepts the contrary pulls of both mind and body, he can overcome the limitations of 
each most effectively. Otherwise, he easily falls prey to the same qualities that are most 
unique to his position in the universe: “Created half to rise, and half to fall; / Great lord of 
all things, yet a prey to all” (15-16).  
 Because of his dual nature, man is created to feel a pull upward and downward as 
he remains in the middle. But each of his capacities—both in the lower and higher 
aspects of his being—has the potential to pull him up or down. A proper use of any 
faculty elevates his being; an improper use distorts it. Thus even his reason and spirit, 
things he shares with those above him on the chain, can pull him down when used 
wrongly. Mack writes, “Though human beings have affinities with the Godlike-rational, 
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they must recognize in themselves (as the Stoics failed to do: hence their ‘pride’) equally 
strong affinities with the animal-sensitive, realizing that the task laid on them is to 
reconcile both characters” (A Life 532). Although it is a perversion of human nature to 
cater too much to the whims of the body, it is also a perversion to deny the body 
altogether, for, as we saw above, man contains “too much weakness for the Stoic’s pride” 
(6). The stoic perversion oversteps man’s proper bounds through a prideful faith in 
reason. A writer, Pope insists in An Essay on Criticism, “might his servile province well 
command, / Would all but stoop to what they understand” (66-67). Man, too, can best 
command the province of his identity by “stooping” to accommodate the lower elements 
of his being. According to Mack, a pervasive theme in An Essay on Man applies to 
authors and critics as it does to any who seek understanding: “we excel by giving up—
not only what is inappropriate to the individual self but what is inappropriate to man as 
man” (Introduction lxx-lxxi). Pride ignores the boundaries established by man’s very 
nature. In the first epistle of An Essay on Man, Pope describes the effects of pride on 
man’s nature: 
  In pride, in reas’ning Pride, our error lies; 
  All quit their sphere, and rush into the skies. 
  Pride still is aiming at the blessed abodes, 
  Men would be Angels, Angels would be Gods. 
  Aspiring to be Gods, if Angels fell, 
  Aspiring to be Angels, Men rebel; 
  And who but wishes to invert the laws, 
  Or ORDER, sins against th’ eternal cause. (I.123-30) 
Marken 63 
A stoic denial of the body attempts to place man on equal footing with the angels, which, 
Pope recognizes, is a sinful breach of his nature. Pope argues that the godlike half of 
man’s nature cannot consistently be elevated over his animal nature; to do so would be a 
denial of his true nature.  
Likewise, the skeptic, who would deny man’s godlike nature, deviates from truth, 
for man has “too much knowledge for the Skeptic side” (5). Skeptics deny the power of 
reason in the pursuit of truth, refusing to give proper credence to the godlike-rational half 
of man’s being. Piper argues that the form of the couplet reflects a proper relationship 
between both natures and a humble but accurate view of human reason: “The mere 
regularity and polish of the couplet, as Pope achieved it from the beginning, carries a 
philosophical, a didactic, implication: that it is necessary for limits to be put on human 
intellectual ambitions and, contrariwise, that the human mind, working within its proper 
limits, has tremendous powers” (Heroic Couplet 137). Skeptics insist on the limitations 
of human reason without recognizing its simultaneous glories. Thus they elevate man’s 
animal nature, which, while necessary for the proper functioning of his godlike faculties, 
is still subservient to them. As Mack writes, “man’s affective nature is inferior to the best 
that is in him—but a contributory cause of what is best” (Introduction xxxviii). Only 
when man cultivates the tension between the two aspects of his being, not denying or 
indulging either, does he reach his true potential as man.  
In addition, man can at times recognize both natures at work in him but still 
respond incorrectly, experiencing either too much or too little tension and thus not 
cultivating a productive relationship between them. When man is “in doubt to act, or 
rest,” he is swinging between extremes, tempering neither and thus misusing both, rather 
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than deliberately steering between them. He exerts too little action or too much. When he 
is “In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast,” he seeks to obliterate one while focusing 
on the other, again failing to cultivate the tension between them. According to Mack, 
“The contrast in [these two lines] is between Stoic and Epicurean alternatives: Rest is 
Stoic apathy, and act is apparently Epicurean hedonism, which Pope seems to have 
identified, a la Hobbes, with ceaseless appetitive agitation” (54n.). Although they 
recognize clear distinctions between man’s material and spiritual nature, Stoics 
overemphasize the distinctions until the two natures are too far apart to create any sort of 
tension; their attempt to ignore one aspect of their own nature prevents them from using 
the other properly. The Epicureans, in contrast, experience too great a tension between 
mind and body and allow their appetites to exert a constant pull on their higher nature, 
creating an overly agitated swinging motion rather than an active steering between two 
tempered natures. Either extreme, activity or passivity, perverts man’s true nature.  
The Soul and the Imagination: Frameworks that Enable Tension 
Just as Pope believed that God was the soul and Nature the body unifying the 
antithetical elements in the physical universe, so he believed man’s soul and body serve 
to unify the discordant elements within man. Mack likens the tensions within man to the 
“comely agreement of warring opposites” outside of him: “the contrary motions of the 
Ptolemaic spheres, the poise of the planets against each other’s influence, the clashing 
elements, the mixture of hostile humors in the body, the strife of reason and passion in 
the soul, the skill of painter and musician, who shape conflicting sounds and colours into 
harmony” each reflect the principle of concors discordia (“Introduction” xlix). As Mack 
notes, the body serves as the physical framework wherein man’s warring passions co-
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exist; the soul, in contrast, serves as the framework for the “strife of reason and passion.” 
In a letter to Caryll on August 14, 1713, Pope writes, “What an Incongruous being is 
Man? How unsettled in his best part, his soul; and how changing and variable in his 
frame of body? The constancy of one, shook by every notion, the temperament of the 
other, affected by every blast of wind. What an April weather in the mind! In a word, 
what is Man altogether, but one mighty Inconsistency” (I.185-86). Even as Pope elevates 
the soul over the body and considers it the “best part” of man, he recognizes the tensions 
that exist between each. Much like Nature, the body serves as a frame, and the functions 
and desires of the body must be placed in proper relationship with the other elements of 
man’s being, including his mind and his soul. When the body functions in a healthy way, 
it enables and contains the proper tension between the “hostile humors” it contains.  
The soul likewise, although it must be kept in proper relationship both to God’s 
spirit and man’s body, has the potential to accommodate and temper “the strife of reason 
and passion.” Fairer argues that Pope assumed three degrees of the soul which Aristotle 
first outlined, and which were generally recognized in the Renaissance: the nutritive soul, 
the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. The rational soul, which included man’s mind, 
reason, and will, set him apart from other creatures; the nutritive soul he shared with all 
living things. His sensitive soul, which housed the imagination, “carried on its functions 
as the brain’s image-making sensorium” (27). In short, the sensitive soul translated the 
perceptions of the senses, which were considered part of the nutritive soul, into images, 
the results of which were then examined by the rational soul. The sensitive soul, then, 
served to temper the other parts of the brain, exerting tension on each and enabling them 
to function appropriately. All three functions, however, are expressions of the soul. The 
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soul undergirds each of man’s faculties and permeates them much like God exists 
immanently in all of Nature. Man’s soul, then, like Nature’s soul, exerts the tension 
necessary to keep the whole of man’s being in its proper position in the universe so that 
discordant elements co-exist in harmony.  
 While for Pope the body provides a physical framework, much like the couplet, 
wherein antithetical “humors” are held in relationship, the imagination, or sensitive soul, 
provides an intangible framework, much like the framework of Nature, which serves to 
hold contradictory elements of man in place. In Pope’s day, Fairer argues, no distinction 
was drawn between fancy and imagination: the imagination’s creative abilities as well as 
its tendency toward delusion were recognized as the expressions of a single faculty (2-5). 
In a 1712 essay in The Spectator on the “Pleasures of the Imagination,” Addison 
describes “the Imagination or Fancy (which I shall use promiscuously)” (497). Pope 
likewise conflates the two, Fairer notes, for in his “poetry the word ‘fancy’ was 
metrically more useful, but in both verse and prose the two terms could be used 
synonymously to avoid repetition” (3). Like Pope’s deliberate use of a single word, such 
as Nature, to describe various expressions of a single idea, his interchanging of words 
such as invention, fancy, and imagination to describe the different manifestations of 
man’s sensitive soul demonstrates his recognition of its simultaneous glories and 
perversions. In his preface to The Iliad of Homer, which Mack calls “a paean to the 
supremacy of the imagination” (Collected in Himself 255), Pope interchanges several 
different words as he describes Homer’s imagination: 
It is to the Strength of this amazing Invention we are to attribute that 
unequal’d Fire and Rapture, which is so forcible in Homer, that no Man of 
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true Poetical Spirit is Master of himself while he reads him . . . the Reader 
is hurry’d out of himself by the Force of the Poet’s Imagination. . . . ’Tis 
however remarkable that his Fancy, which is every where vigorous, is not 
discover’d immediately at the beginning of his Poem in its fullest 
Splendor: It grows in the Progress both upon himself and others, and 
becomes on Fire like a Chariot-Wheel, by its own Rapidity. Exact 
Disposition, just Thought, correct Elocution, polish’d Numbers, may have 
been found in a thousand; but this Poetical Fire, this Vivida vis animi, in a 
very few. (qtd. in Fairer 4, emphasis his)  
When describing Homer’s use of the imagination, Pope draws no distinctions between 
“invention,” “imagination,” “fancy,” or “poetical fire.” Indeed, Fairer argues, “it is more 
important for his purposes to distinguish the power of the imaginative faculty . . . from 
the controllable, conscious, discriminating faculty” (4) of the rational soul.  
Like other faculties, the imagination, if not held in correct antithetical 
relationships with man’s reason, body, or soul, is used corruptly; but when properly 
tempered, it enables man to function as a fully integrated being. It aids both the intellect 
and the senses, for apart from the imagination the senses cannot translate their 
perceptions into usable knowledge. In the second epistle of An Essay on Man, after 
discussing the “passions,”  “which are born to fight” but are “softened” in man’s nature, 
Pope immediately places them in relationship with reason:  
  Suffice that reason keep to Nature’s road, 
  Subject, compound them, follow her and God. 
   
Marken 68 
 
Love, Hope, and Joy, fair pleasure’s smiling train, 
  Hate, Fear, and Grief, the family of pain. (II. 115-18) 
Man’s affections are best controlled by reason when reason keeps to “Nature’s road,” 
and, Pope continues, it is the imagination that permits this relationship: 
  These mix’d with Art, and to due bounds confin’d, 
  Make and maintain the balance of the mind: 
  The lights and shades, whose well-accorded strife 
  Gives all the strength and color of our life. (II. 119-22) 
Such emotions, when “Mix’d with Art” or the part of the soul that translates baser 
passions and images into human artistic creation, contribute to the “well-accorded strife” 
that permits a balance of the mind. Within its “due bounds” and in relationship with 
reason, the sensitive soul is manifested in many ways; outside of such bounds it is 
quickly misused. 
In his preface to the Iliad of Homer, Pope continues to describe Homer’s 
imagination: “How fertile will that imagination appear, which as able to clothe all the 
properties of elements, the qualifications of the mind, the virtues and vices, in forms and 
persons, and to introduce them into actions agreeable to the nature of the things they 
shadowed!” (n. pag.). Homer’s imagination expresses the complexity of both the 
intangible mind and the tangible body of his characters and permits the tension between 
them, thus aptly reflecting the reality of men. Similarly, man’s imagination keeps other 
faculties positioned properly and functioning as is fitting to their nature. The Renaissance 
writers who grappled with the idea of the imagination as Pope understood it were often 
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tempted to downplay the imagination in favor of reason. But even Gianrancesco Pico, 
who was extremely wary of the use of the imagination, believed it necessary to 
contemplation, that state wherein both mind and body grapple with an idea transcendent 
over them both: “Imagination enters into alliance with all the superior powers, inasmuch 
as they would fail in that function into which nature has bestowed upon each of them 
unless imagination support and assist them. Nor could the soul, fettered as it is to the 
body, opine, know, or comprehend at all, if phantasy were not constantly to supply it with 
the images themselves” (qtd. in Fairer 43). The sensitive soul, which man shares with 
creatures beneath him on the Great Chain, serves a different function in man than it does 
in the other creatures, for it works in conjunction with his rational soul, which is unique 
to man. Fairer writes, “The neoplatonic duality of body and soul, and the consequent 
placing of man between the angel and the beast, naturally encouraged the conviction that 
the imagination reflected man’s paradoxical nature. It could raise him higher or pull him 
down according to the extent to which it followed the spirit or the flesh” (28-29). 
Imagination has the potential to be the framework in the brain wherein the tension 
between man’s two natures is cultivated.  
Perversions of the Imagination: “One Vile Antithesis” 
In An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, Pope satirically attacks Sporus, the castrated boy 
Nero kept for pleasure and eventually married. Sporus’s character represents Lord 
Hervey, a bisexual whose “character was a chaos of obsessive impulses” (Mack, A Life 
648). His wit, the expression of his imagination in his writing, reflects the perversion of 
his character: 
 
Marken 70 
His Wit all see-saw, between that and this,  
Now high, now low, now Master up, now Miss, 
And he himself one vile Antithesis. (323-25) 
Pope again interrupts a pattern of couplets with a triplet, this time to indicate a negative 
perversion of a healthy pattern. Sporus’s imagination, rather than serving both the flesh 
and the spirit—the parts of man that permit him linguistic expression and contribute to 
literary endeavors—becomes an end in itself as it swings back and forth, “all see-saw,” 
from one extreme to the next. The emphasis is on his imagination and its distracting 
movements. Piper notes that “[t]here are in Pope’s mature verse . . . double antitheses 
within single lines: ‘Now high, now low, now Master up, now Miss’” (Heroic Couplet 
132). Pope’s mastery of his craft enables him to portray a rapid swinging motion as 
Sporus alternates between identities. Ian Donaldson argues that the repetition of “now” 
serves the same purpose: “the repeated word dramatizes this uncertainty, precipitating us 
from one possibility to another” (193) and emphasizing a sideways movement but 
diminishing the strength of couplets to move forward with a steering motion. The 
ineffectiveness of Sporus’s imagination, Donaldson notes, is also emphasized in Pope’s 
repetition of words such as “whether,” “or,” and “half” (193) in the following passage:  
  Whether in florid impotence he speaks, 
  And, as the Prompter breathes, the Puppet squeaks; 
  Or at the Ear of Eve, familiar Toad,  
  Half Froth, half Venom, spits himself abroad, 
  In Puns, or Politicks, or Tales, or Lyes, 
  Or spite, or Smut, or Rymes, or Blasphemies. (317-322) 
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His use of language—in his “Puns” and “Tales” and “Lyes” and “Rymes”—is a 
perversion, for he uses it to deceive others and to attempt to make himself look appealing, 
much like the serpent in the garden. He uses his imaginative faculty in a way unfitting for 
man and as a result is unable to temper extremes in his nature or his expression. Stable 
antitheses reflect and affirm a Christian understanding of “both-and” paradoxes, wherein 
opposing ideas are elevated, whereas the shifting implied by the repetitive “or” and 
“now” in the passages above diminishes such paradox as Sporus corrupts the tensions in 
his being. Sporus’s appearance further reflects unproductive antithetical extremes 
between his godlike and animal-like natures: “A Cherub’s face, a Reptile all the rest” 
(331). He lacks productive tension within his being and indulges extremes on both sides 
and in doing so becomes incoherent. Neither his head nor his heart is true to his nature as 
a man. He is an “Amphibious Thing! that acting either Part, / The trifling Head, or the 
corrupted Heart” (326-27). In Sporus’s image, then, Pope demonstrates the differences 
between a useful antithetical relationship and a “pseudo-antithesis” (Bailey 439). When 
Sporus “[oscillates] between the empty deictics of ‘that’ and ‘this’” (439), such antitheses 
blur boundaries and disregard proper distinctions, perverting each side of the antithesis 
while increasing the unproductive movement between them. In Sporus, Pope assumes a 
duality between man’s mind and body and shows man’s tendency to place each in an 
improper relationship with his imagination.  
The Servant as Master: Unfixed Natures and the Misuse of the Imagination 
  In contrast to the ideal woman in Epistle to a Lady, Pope presents two other 
women, Eloisa in Eloisa to Abelard and Belinda in The Rape of the Lock, who are unable 
to achieve an integrated being. Each is passionate and possesses a strong imagination, 
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and, like Sporus, each misuses her imagination. Indeed, as Fairer writes, “Pope associated 
women with the imaginative faculty, partly because he accepted the widely-held view of 
his day that woman was by nature more ‘fanciful’ than man, but also because of a deeper 
fascination which frequently led him to direct his imagination towards them in intriguing 
ways” (17). While Pope saw women, such as Martha Blount, as possessing the greatest 
potential to cultivate the imagination, he also recognized in them the greatest likelihood 
to apply it unfittingly, as the “variegated tulips” in An Epistle to a Lady show. Belinda 
and Eloisa each represent a perversion of the imagination in some way, and, because the 
imagination is crucial in maintaining the proper relationship between man’s lower and 
higher natures, the antithetical aspects of humanity do not exist in proper tension in each 
woman: Belinda cultivates too great a tension between the parts of her being as she 
attempts to keep each half distant and unaffected by the other, thus swinging from one 
expression of her imagination to the next; Eloisa, on the other hand, desires to resolve the 
tension altogether as she fails to draw proper boundaries between the two halves of her 
being and merges them. 
Belinda’s imagination never requires her to confront the truth about her own 
nature; instead, it distances her from it. For Addison and many other contemporaries of 
Pope, the imagination was opposed to judgment; man’s judgment expressed truth while 
the imagination was, at its best, purely fanciful, and, more frequently, contradictory of 
truth.7 As we have seen, however, Pope saw in the imagination the potential to lift man                                                         
7 For a more extensive look at the progression of the idea of the imagination from the 
early eighteenth century through the nineteenth, see “Wit and Imagination in Eighteenth-
Century Aesthetics” by M. A. Goldberg. Goldberg traces the shift from viewing 
imagination as “reason’s antithesis,” serving only to corrupt man’s understanding of 
truth, to imagination as purely “ornamental, associational, and pleasurable,” contributing 
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upward or bring him downward as it interacted with the other elements of man’s being. 
Imagination was for Pope, Fairer argues, “a good servant but a bad master” (28). It could 
drive man to truth or turn him from it, serve the other elements of his being or turn 
inward and deny the other elements their full expression. In The Rape of the Lock, 
Belinda’s mind and body are both subservient to her imagination. The extensive additions 
to the poem serve to emphasize Belinda’s imagination: the most significant changes 
between the two canto version published in 1712 and the five canto version of 1714 was 
the addition of the machinery of the poem, particularly the sylphs, that lies outside the 
realm of reality. Belinda’s association with the sylphs also emphasizes her attraction to 
the immaterial: “Fairest of Mortals, thou distinguish’d Care / Of thousand bright 
Inhabitants of Air!” (I.27-28). Belinda is placed in the care of the sylphs in much the 
same was as she is controlled by her imagination.  
Since the sylphs lie outside the realm of reality, they also, for Fairer, lie outside 
the moral realm. The world of the sylphs, he argues, is “removed from the world of moral 
judgments” and represents “neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad,’” thus “exploit[ing] the inherent 
ambiguity of the imagination itself” (62-64). Because, he continues, the sylphs escape 
moral judgment from readers, they “[enact] the amoral role of the imagination by 
dissolving the tidy human boundaries between virtue and vice” (64-65). But rather than 
dissolving the categories, perhaps Pope’s use of the imagination suggests that it has the 
capacity to go both ways—to be pulled upward or downward—and create virtue or vice 
in the one who possesses it. The sylphs may remain outside the human realm with its                                                         
to man’s experience of beauty but completely outside the moral realm of truth, to, finally, 
imagination as a crucial faculty in the pursuit of truth (503-09).  
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inescapable vices, and thus, unable to sin, remain also unable to achieve virtue, but 
Belinda’s response to the sylphs—and her corresponding use of her imagination, as the 
fundamental faculty that enables the integration of her being—occurs in the moral plane 
on which humans live their lives. The sylphs, while representative of Belinda’s 
imagination, are not its equivalent, in much the same way as the Genius of the Place is 
not the equivalent of the artistic expression within a garden itself. A gardener is required 
to elucidate the principles hidden in the landscape. The Genius of the Place simply exists, 
but the way a gardener follows it and cultivates it in a plot of land determines, for Pope, 
the artfulness of the garden. There are both right and wrong ways to trace the genius, just 
as there are right and wrong expressions of the intangible imagination the sylphs 
manifest. In humans, the use of the imagination is inescapably moral, for its position 
between reason and passion, between the mind and body, necessitates its involvement in 
either a prideful or a proper response to human nature.  
Pope himself offers a helpful distinction between the moral realm and the role the 
sylphs play in the poem, but he does so without diminishing Belinda’s responsibility. 
First, the actions of the sylphs are not confined to the immaterial, although their nature 
remains such. Le Bossu, who was, according to Dryden, “one of the best modern critics” 
(qtd. in Tillotson, “Introduction” 109), was also one of the earliest critics to outline the 
crucial characteristics of mock epics, and he discusses the machinery crucial to both epics 
and mock epics. Such machinery, he argues, can represent the God-like aspects or 
material aspects of men; it can represent virtue or vice (Tillotson 109). Because the 
machinery is merely representative, though, its existence can in itself remain morally 
neutral. For, Tillotson notes in his introduction in the Twickeham edition of the text, 
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“Pope sees to it that the additions include specimens of all the three kinds of machine 
noted by Le Bossu: the sylphs are ‘theological’ (they represented ‘good’ and ‘bad’), 
‘physical,’ (they roll planets and attend to the weather), and ‘allegorical’ or ‘moral’ (the 
machines include Spleen)” (121). The sylphs, while remaining invisible, can interact with 
every realm, just as the imagination should, and do not merely serve themselves.  
Second, when he responded to Dennis’s critical Remarks on Mr. Pope’s Rape of 
the Lock, printed in 1728, Pope further clarified his conception of the sylphs. When 
Belinda hears Ariel speak to her in a “Morning-Dream” (I.22), he describes “The light 
Militia of the lower Sky” as “These, tho’ unseen, are ever on the Wing, / Hand o’er the 
Box, and hover round the Ring” (I.42-45). Pope’s placing of the sylphs in the “Lower 
Sky” here is significant, Tillotson notes, for it draws a distinction between the “aerial 
sylphs” and “ethereal” (148n). Dennis was particularly critical of Ariel’s speech where he 
describes the types of sylphs: 
 Ye know the Spheres and various Tasks assign’d, 
 By Laws Eternal, to th’ Aerial Kind. 
 Some in the Fields of purest Aether play, 
 And bask and whiten in the Blaze of Day. 
Some guide the Course of wandring Orbs on high, 
Or roll the Planets thro’ the boundless Sky. (II. 75-80) 
In his notes, Dennis asks, “Did you ever hear before that the Planets were roll’d by the 
aerial Kind?” (qtd. in Tillotson 372n). Pope’s later annotations perhaps address Dennis’s 
question, for he blots out several notes in the margin and then, seemingly overcoming 
indecision, footnotes “Aether” and in the margin writes “aetheri[al]” (Tillotson 372n). 
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Pope makes another note to point out that “Aerial Substances” are those beneath the 
moon who primarily serve humans and whose actions are evident in the physical realm 
Le Bossu discusses (Tillotson 372-73n). Pope assumes ranks among the sylphs, and 
recognizes that many in this immaterial realm are not necessarily “heavenly.” Pope could, 
Tillotson argues, have upheld Le Bossu’s categories and have been “roughly within his 
rights if lines 77-80 were understood as a parenthesis (‘You know the tasks assigned to 
the sylphs of the air—there is, of course, a superior kind of sylph, not aerial but ethereal, 
who rolls the planets . . .’)” (373n). There are, then, many sylphs, particularly those who 
are assigned to work among humans, who are immaterial but not necessarily an ideal 
projection of the crux of man’s sensitive soul. The imagination likewise can serve 
different functions, but an objective standard—Nature and Nature’s God—is still in place 
that determines which function of the imagination raises man to his “highest.” Some uses 
of the imagination are morally superior to others, just as some sylphs are placed in a 
higher position in the universe than others.  
Belinda’s response to the influence of the sylphs, then, is not morally neutral. Her 
use of her imagination, revealed in her involvement with the sylphs, negatively affects 
her identity, and Pope sees such use as a misuse because of her failure to “steer” rather 
than “swing” between extremes. At the beginning of the poem, she is entirely absorbed 
with immaterial ideals and denies the true nature of her material being. Ariel encourages 
her to focus her attention only on higher things: “Hear and believe! thy own Importance 
know, / Nor bound thy narrow Views to Things below” (I.35-36). Ariel, speaking to her 
in a dream, even communicates with her in an other-worldly fashion, turning her thoughts 
from the real into the invisible world of the imagination. Ariel entices Belinda into 
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believing a denial of her humanity is noble; he tells her to “Know farther yet; Whoever 
fair and chaste / Rejects Mankind, is by some Sylph embraced” (I. 66-67). As she is 
“embraced” by a Sylph, she also becomes possessed by her imagination; she is slave to it 
rather than master over it.  
Belinda’s inaccurate self-understanding reflects the control her imagination has 
over her and is evident almost immediately after she awakes from the dream as she stands 
at her toilet admiring herself:  
And now, unveil’d, the Toilet stands display’d, 
Each Silver Vase in mystic Order laid. 
First, rob’d in White, the Nymph intent adores 
With Head uncover’d, the Cosmetic Pow’rs.  
A heav’nly Image in the Glass appears, 
To that she bends, to that her Eyes she rears; 
Th’inferior Priestess, at her Altar’s side, 
Trembling, begins the sacred Rites of Pride. (I.121-28) 
She sees only the heavenly half of her being, and she is subsumed by an image of herself 
that is detached from reality. Even her use of make-up is a denial rather than an 
affirmation of the materiality of her body, for she uses it to conceal rather than accentuate 
her true nature: 
Unnumber’d Treasures ope at once, and here 
The various Off’rings of the World appear; 
From each she nicely culls with curious Toil, 
And decks the Goddess with the glitt’ring Spoil. (I.129-132) 
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She dresses herself as is fitting for a Goddess rather than a maiden and uses the 
“Off’rings” of the physical “World” only to disguise the traces of that same world in her 
being:  
   Yet graceful Ease, and Sweetness void of Pride, 
Might hide her Faults, if Belles had Faults to hide: 
If to her share some Female Errors fall, 
Look on her Face, and you’ll forget ’em all. (II.15-18) 
Her social and physical graces hide any imperfections, and the falsity of appearance is 
used purely to deny the physicality of her being, setting her apart from others as she 
“Rejects Mankind.” As Belinda stands at her toilet, an observer can “See by Degrees a 
purer blush arise / And keener Lightnings quicken in her Eyes” (I.137-144). She uses art 
to contradict her nature, and this becomes particularly evident as she applies blush. In 
Breaking and Remaking: Aesthetic Practice in England, 1700-1820, Ronald Paulson 
discusses these lines:  
The “purer” blush is, of course, the “blush” made by cosmetics, which 
replace, augment, and fix the color at a point where an impure thought 
could produce a natural blush that is in fact less pure than one created by 
art: but art requires the basis of fact, Belinda’s natural beauty, thought 
fallen and so in need of “correcting” by art. (In Belinda’s case a blush 
would only give her away, revealing the crucial fact that she is in love and 
with whom . . .). (52)  
Make-up, like clothing, is necessitated by man’s fallen nature, and here, Belinda’s 
“donning of make-up assumes an Eve already fallen” (51). The blush she applies is 
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“purer” in her mind than a natural blush because a natural blush affirms the passions of 
her lower nature and reveals her love. The artfulness of her blush is not properly 
reflective of her nature because, even if it is rooted in fact, it is an attempt to hide the 
truth. At its root, Belinda’s denial of her humanity results in an unfixed nature: “Her 
lively Looks a sprightly Mind disclose, / Quick as her Eyes, and as unfix’d as those” (II. 
9-10).  
 When the lock is cut, however, Belinda is brought out of the realm of the purely 
immaterial. Indeed, it is not until moments before her lock is taken that even Ariel senses 
in Belinda “in spite of all her Art, / An Earthly Lover lurking at her Heart” (III.143-44). 
She has effectively hidden her material desires even from the sylph who should safeguard 
her soul. Her imagination is detached from the rest of her being so effectively that the 
primary source of her despair over the Baron’s action “is that he treats the lock as a thing 
rather than an idea” and “thus challenges Belinda to descend from the metaphorical into 
the realm of truth” (Fairer 74). Just as in An Essay on Criticism Pope reminds authors and 
critics that “all must stoop to what they understand,” Belinda is here forced to assume her 
proper place as a human being. Because her imagination is misused, however, she does 
not integrate her lower nature more fully into who she is but rather indulges her material 
nature, swinging to the other extreme. Even in her immediate response to the loss of her 
lock, Belinda plunges into a deluge of emotions: 
Then flash’d the living Lightning from her Eyes, 
And Screams of Horror rend th’ affighted Skies. 
Not louder Shrieks to pitying Heav’n are cast, 
When Husbands or when Lap-dogs breathe their last, 
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Or when rich China Vessels, fal’n from high, 
In glittering Dust and painted Fragments lie! (III. 155-160) 
To the unfixed nature of her mind, the death of a husband or a broken China dish—or the 
loss of a lock of hair—are all equally worthy of the horror she feels. Once in the material 
realm, she does not temper her emotions: she equates noble sorrows with petty as she 
fails to cultivate tension between her passions and her immaterial nature.  
 She descends into the Cave of Spleen, but remains solely at the mercy of her 
imagination: “The flattering sylphs have left her, to be replaced by the imaginative world 
of the guilt-ridden and prudish gnomes, the sad mental landscape of the melancholic” 
(Fairer 77). Indeed, Fairer defines the Spleen as “the seedbed of the base imagination, the 
melancholy fancy which in women can lead to self-delusions and hysteria” (76). The 
truth of the outside world seems far removed from such a place:  
A constant Vapour o’er the Palace flies; 
Strange Phantoms rising as the Mists arise; 
Dreadful, as Hermit’s Dreams in haunted Shades, 
Or bright as Visions of expiring Maids. (IV. 40-43) 
Once there, Belinda regrets that she ever brought her lock, so significant in her 
imagination, into the daylight of reality: 
  Oh had I rather un-admir’d remain’d 
  In some lone Isle, or distant Northern Land; 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  There kept my Charms conceal’d from mortal Eye, 
  Like Roses that in Desarts bloom and die. (IV. 153-54, 57-58) 
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In the twilight of her melancholy, she laments that the two aspects of her being were ever 
brought close enough for any sort of tension. She also regrets that she did not better heed 
Ariel’s prophetic words in her dream: “A Sylph too warn’d me of the Threats of Fate, / In 
mystic Visions, now believ’d too late!” (IV.165-66). Here she recognizes that she 
believed such “mystic Visions” were completely removed from reality; she knows now 
that the two are inescapably intertwined, but she insists on keeping them separate. The 
Cave of Spleen has the same effects on all its inhabitants: 
Unnumber’d Throngs on ev’ry side are seen 
Of bodies chang’d to various Forms by Spleen.  
Here living Teapots stand, one Arm held out, 
One bent; the Handle this, and that the Spout: 
A Pinkin there like Homer’s Tripod walks; 
Here sighs a Jar, and there a Goose-pye talks; 
Men prove with Child, as pow’rful Fancy works, 
And Maids turn’d Bottels, call aloud for Corks. (IV. 47-54) 
Tillotson notes that the corruptions Pope lists here “represent illusions commonly 
suffered by the splenetic” and that those with melancholy personalities, according to 
Burton’s Anatomy, often consider themselves “pots, glasses, &c.” The “metamorphoses” 
(Tillotson 184n) these beings undergo and the perversions of their physical bodies 
demonstrates an improper use of “pow’rful Fancy,” for it serves its own interests rather 
than strengthening the other aspects of man. The “metamorphosis” caused by such use of 
the imagination usurps each individual’s true identity. 
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Belinda, then, remains controlled by her imagination, although in that instant, 
when “The meeting Points” of the scissors “the sacred Hair dissever / From the fair 
Head” (III.153-54), her imagination swings to an opposite extreme, from the airy sylphs 
to the earthy gnomes. Fairer describes the bondage of her imagination: 
The imagination has again transformed the scene, and for the lighter-than-
air fancy of the sylphs has submitted ideas of oppressive weight and 
constriction. The act of imagination that created her lock is now seen 
(equally wrongly) as a ritual of bondage. The dressing-table has become a 
torture chamber. Belinda cannot break out of her imagination, only 
migrate from one image to another. (79) 
The images themselves—instead of the parts of her body they represent—remain of 
utmost importance to Belinda. Rather than serve her body and her mind and bring them 
into a healthy tension, the images control her. Her imagination is master rather than 
servant, leaving her less able to function in the real world outside of her mind rather than 
equipping her better for it.  
While it seems as though Belinda is embracing both natures, her failure to do so 
simultaneously renders tension unproductive. Her swinging from one extreme to the other 
keeps each part of her nature too far removed from the other to become integrated. Her 
retreat into the realm of the imagination and denial of her passions, Parkin argues, creates 
in her the “desire not to be violated and yet explicit preparation for it” (Poetic 
Workmanship 51). Either extreme is more attractive to her than the work of steering 
between them: “Just as generic man loses if he tries to be either god or beast, so does 
generic woman, represented by Belinda. If Belinda remains inviolate, she will lose in one 
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sense; if she does not, she will lose in another” (51). Neither extreme holds for Belinda 
what her self-serving imagination promises. Instead, 
A woman wins the war between the sexes by losing it under the proper 
conditions—by honorable surrender. For Belinda, either spinsterhood or 
dishonorable surrender is advantageous, just as either angelhood or 
animality would be for mankind in general. And just as mankind can 
escape these disadvantageous extremes by recognizing his middle nature 
and souring humbly, so Belinda can to some extent combine the 
advantages of her two extremes by the middle course of lawful marriage. 
(52) 
Her imagination causes her to swing between these extremes and ultimately corrupts her 
human nature.  
 In Eloisa to Abelard, Eloisa likewise misuses her imagination. She retreats into a 
convent in an attempt to obliterate her feelings for the castrated Abelard, and, while there, 
where she acquires a letter Abelard wrote that tells his story, and as she reads it 
withdraws further into her imagination: “In these deep solitudes and awful cells, / Where 
heav’nly-pensive, contemplation dwells, / And ever-musing melancholy reigns” (1-3). 
Visited by Melancholy and torn between the passion for Abelard she experiences in her 
lower nature and the pursuit of God she seeks with her higher nature, Eloisa, like Belinda, 
at times swings to an extreme, indulging only half her nature. Ultimately, though, she is 
unable to maintain the distinctions between each half, for, as her imagination controls 
her, increasing her melancholy and despair, she grows less and less able to see her desire 
for God and her desire for Abelard as separate passions. She too withdraws from 
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humanity to the solace of her imagination, but she withdraws to seek God, whom she 
identifies with Abelard. In contrast to Belinda, who diminishes the tension in her nature 
by maintaining too great a distance between parts, Eloisa attempts to escape tension by 
merging elements of her being. In The Argument of Eloisa to Abelard, Pope describes 
Eloisa’s story as “a picture of the struggles of grace and nature, virtue and passion” (298). 
The struggle ultimately takes place in her imagination: nature, in the sense Pope is using 
it here, encompasses human emotion and the desires of the animal-like nature that 
contrast with reason, while grace is accessible in part because of the God-like functions 
of man’s being. Similarly, virtue cannot exist apart from human volition, and the will is 
part of man’s God-like nature, while passion he shares with those beneath him on the 
Great Chain of Being. Eloisa struggles to keep two distinct natures at work together in 
her imagination, fusing them into a perversion.  
 As she imagines speaking to Abelard, Eloisa reminds him that when she took the 
vows, she was thinking only of him: 
  Heav’n scarce believ’d the conquest it survey’d, 
  And Saints with wonder heard the vows I made. 
  Yet then, to those dread altars as I drew, 
  Not on the Cross my eyes were fix’d, but you; 
  Not grace, or zeal, love only was my call, 
  And if I lose thy love, I lose my all. (113-18) 
In her mind, Abelard’s name is intertwined with God’s, and she asks her heart to disguise 
her passion for Abelard with her understanding of God: “Hide it, my heart, within that 
close disguise, / Where mix’d with God’s, his lov’d Idea lies” (11-12). She pleads that 
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she might, like the other women in the convent, learn to escape any passions other than a 
love for God: 
  Ah no! instruct me other joys to prize, 
  With other beauties charm my partial eyes, 
Full in my view set all the bright abode, 
  And make my soul quit Abelard for God. (127-28) 
Her sisters in the convent have, in her perception, subsumed the lower half of their nature 
into the noble life of their higher natures inside the convent walls: 
  Relentless walls! whose darksom round contains 
  Repentant sighs, and voluntary pains: 
  Ye rugged rocks! which holy knees have worn; 
  Ye grots and caverns shagg’d with horrid thorn! (17-20) 
The “voluntary pains” of the others in the convent suggest that their physical suffering—
or the control of their passions—is subjected entirely to the mind and the will; for Eloisa, 
however, the passion is not quieted, despite her attempts to escape it. Her goal in entering 
the monastery was to encourage her love for Abelard to cease as she learned love for 
God: 
  Now warm in love, now with’ring in thy bloom, 
  Lost in a convent’s solitary gloom! 
  There stern religion quench’d th’ unwilling flame, 
  There dy’d the best of passions, Love and Flame. (37-40) 
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She hopes, as she takes the vows, that religion will “quench” her romantic love. She 
imagines that to “fill [her] fond heart with God alone” will enable her to subdue her 
emotions: 
  Unequal task! a passion to resign, 
  For hearts so touch’d, so pierc’d, so lost as mine. 
  Ere such a soul regains its peaceful state, 
  How often must it love, how often hate! 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  Oh come! oh teach me nature to subdue, 
  Renounce my love, my life, my self—and you. 
  Fill my fond heart with God alone, for he 
  Alone can rival, can succeed to thee. (192-98, 203-06) 
She longs to overcome her desires and ignore the tensions inevitable in her middle state, 
and believes that if her feelings for God can “succeed” those she feels for Abelard she 
can escape the tension.  
But, unlike her religious sisters, she is unable to suppress the passions of her 
lower nature with the will of her higher nature. Instead, she writes, 
  Tho’ cold like you, unmov’d, and silent grown, 
  I have not yet forgot my self to stone. 
  All is not Heav’n while Abelard has part, 
  Still rebel nature holds out half my heart. (23-26) 
She cannot commit her whole being to the service of God while Abelard is still alive, for 
her “rebel nature” controls half her heart. Indeed, her physical desire for Abelard renders 
Marken 87 
any service to God senseless and hollow; she can apply neither her mind nor her heart 
fully to her spiritual tasks as Abelard continues to exist in her imagination: 
  I waste the Matin lamp in sighs for thee,   
  Thy image steals between my God and me, 
  Thy voice I seem in ev’ry hymn to hear, 
  With ev’ry bead I drop too soft a tear. (267-70) 
In Eloisa’s subjective perspective, Parkin argues, “God and Abelard are parallel” (Poetic 
Workmanship 72). Her desire to diminish the tension between her love for Abelard and 
her love for God has fused the images of them in her mind, but rather than escape tension 
altogether she has merely cultivated an unproductive tension. She pleads with Abelard 
first to 
  Come, if thou dar’st, all charming as thou art! 
  Oppose thy self to heav’n; dispute my heart; 
  Come, with one glance of those deluding eyes, 
  Blot out each idea of the skies. (281-84) 
She longs for him to return to her so that she can renounce her duties as a nun entirely: 
  Take back that grace, those sorrows, and those tears, 
  Take back my fruitless penitence and pray’rs, 
  Snatch me, just mounting, from the blest abode, 
  Assist the Fiends and tear me from my God! (285-88) 
So desperate is she to resolve the tension that she wants Abelard to replace her service to 
God entirely, to obviate the need for her prayers—which were never genuine but rather 
rooted in her despair over the loss of her lover—and, essentially to be her god, fulfilling 
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her spiritual and material needs. But, in the very next line, she insists in her passion that 
she would rather him leave her entirely, even in her memory, so that she can live without 
tension: 
  No, fly me, fly me! far as Pole from Pole; 
  Rise Alps between us! and whole oceans roll! 
  Ah come not, write not, think not once of me, 
  Nor share one pang of all I felt for thee. 
  Thy oaths I quit, thy memory resign, 
  Forget, renounce me, hate whate’er was mine. (289-94) 
She would be almost as content if he vanished entirely as her imagination conceives of no 
distinction between God and Abelard; it has turned inward and desires only to escape 
tension by having one image entirely dominate the other. Indeed, Fairer writes, it seems 
“almost as though it hardly mattered which of the two images fully possessed her” (45). 
Because she will not accept the tension that best becomes her, she is unable to live in a 
way that affirms her identity. At the end of the poem, she longs for death, as she believes 
it to be the only way to escape her passions, but, as Parkin notes, death “can bring [her 
struggle] to an end” but it is only “an end, not a solution” (Poetic Workmanship 73).  
To love both God and Abelard properly, Eloisa needs an integrated being that 
responds to both as is fitting for her human nature. When she combines her desire for 
each of them into one passion, she fails to observe the crucial distinctions between 
them—and between the lower and higher elements of her own being. She diminishes her 
own identity as she seeks to escape the tension, for “we acknowledge the uneasy paradox 
hidden at the very center of our nature, and which we are always tempted to dissolve in 
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the interests of a more stable, though limited and false, identity” (Bogel 121). Mark 
writes that to give up either part of her nature, “though it would end her torment, would 
be a surrender of some part of her reality, a partial denial of the identity that defines her . 
. .” (A Life 326). In her pride, Eloisa, like Belinda, attempts to dissolve the tension that is 
an inherent part of her nature. She attempts to merge both her natures into one, thereby 
diminishing the distinctions between them, while Belinda swings entirely from one 
extreme to the next, passionately embracing one and then the other but never cultivating a 
productive tension between them. Both misuse the imagination, and the imagination, for 
Pope, is one of mankind’s greatest glories, for, as it affirms both halves of his nature, it 
can raise him to the highest stature as becomes his status as man.   
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Chapter Three: A Safeguard of Mystery:  
 “Look On Heav’n With More than Mortal Eyes” 
 Ultimately, Pope recognized, to know oneself is to accept paradox: the paradox of 
one’s own nature. Man’s middle position on the Great Chain of Being consists of both 
spiritual and material qualities, and he must integrate both aspects of his being, holding 
them in productive tension in order to best possess each. In order to best understand truth 
and maintain a unified nature, man must accept the tension between the two parts of his 
being and give thorough expression to each. Chesterton’s examination of the relationship 
between the martyr and the suicide is helpful here; he notes that, while they may look 
superficially the same, one demonstrates acceptance of the nature of man, the other the 
denial of it. “Obviously,” he writes, “the suicide is the opposite of the martyr. A martyr is 
a man who cares so much for something outside of him that he forgets his own personal 
life. A suicide is a man who cares so little for anything outside him, that he wants to see 
that last of everything” (Orthodoxy 230). The martyr recognizes the paradoxes that 
comprise his nature and embraces them, affirming life despite inescapable tensions. The 
suicide, who despairs rather than confesses, cannot live with such tension and instead 
destroys himself. Man’s acceptance of his position gives the fullest expression to all the 
parts of his nature; a suicide’s action is a perversion of a martyr’s action because he is not 
expressing his true nature.  
In the second epistle of Essay on Man, Pope describes the mystery that results 
from the tension within man that stems from his dual nature:  
This light and darkness in our chaos join’d, 
What shall divide? The God within the mind. 
Marken 91 
Extremes in Nature equal ends produce,   
In Man they join to some mysterious use. (II.203-06) 
In his “Epistle to Bathurst” (1733), Pope alters the lines to describe the relationship of 
men within society: 
Hear then the truth: “Tis Heav’n each Passion sends, 
“And diff’rent men directs to diff’rent ends. 
“Extremes in Nature equal good produce, 
“Extremes in Man concur to gen’ral use.” (161-64) 
While his focus shifts and the extremes he is discussing differ, Pope repeats himself 
almost exactly in order to draw attention to the relationship itself, which remains 
unchanged. In a footnote to Essay on Man in the Twickenham edition of the text, 
Maynard Mack notes the relationship between the two passages. In An Essay on Man, 
“the emphasis is on man the individual, and the paradox is the co-operation between vice 
and virtue in a particular person. [In the “Epistle to Bathurst”] Pope is thinking in terms 
of society, e.g. that the spendthrift is balanced by the miser” (80n). Thus he emphasizes 
the productivity of such tension in man’s communal and individual actions; it is present 
in the objective world and in man’s subjective understanding. Pope recognizes in all of 
life the same framework of antithetical tension he presents in individual couplets in his 
poetry. Such tension reflects mystery, which is a crucial part of his understanding of 
truth. In Windsor Forest, Pope depicts the good life of one who “observe[s] a mean” and 
“follows Nature” (251-52): he “looks on Heav’n with more than mortal Eyes” (253). The 
more integrated one’s being is, the closer one comes to understanding all of truth that is 
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accessible to man. He is also best able to transcend his limitations and to look on the 
aspects of truth that reflect heaven: mysterious truths beyond man’s reason.8 
Self-knowledge requires knowledge of one’s limitations, but it also requires 
acceptance of one’s glories and the proper cultivation of them. Properly tempered and 
expressed, reason is one of man’s greatest glories. An individual must “follow Nature” in 
responding to his own “ruling passion,” and, Pope writes, “Reason is here no guide, but 
still a guard: / ’Tis hers to rectify, not overthrow, / And treat this passion more as friend 
than foe” (Essay on Man II. 161-63). Reason ought to stand as a guard over an 
individual’s ruling passion, but not guide and dominate it. Reason can temper the 
passions and “rectify” them when they tend toward extremes. But reason must remain a 
“friend” to other faculties and be tempered by them in order to function at its fullest 
capacity. Critics who write “drily plain, without invention’s aid” ultimately “leave the 
sense, their learning to display, / And those explain the meaning quite away” (Essay on 
Criticism 114, 116-17). Part of the whole truth is lost—its meaning is explained “quite 
away”—if it is subjected entirely to reason. Likewise, critics who fail to observe the 
proper relationship of whole to parts in the criticism, like a gardener who fails to cultivate 
the proper relationship between the two in a garden, pridefully attempt to over-
systematize the parts. Full understanding of a single part, which is attainable through 
reason, is preferred to an understanding of the whole, which requires man to confront that 
the whole truth is beyond his understanding. Any preference to one “one small sect” in                                                         
8 In “‘See Mystery to Mathematics fly!’: Pope’s Dunciad and the Critique of Religious 
Rationalism,” B. W. Young argues that Book IV of Pope’s Dunciad is as much a critique 
of the Christian Rationalism of philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz that denies 
mystery as it is a critique of deism. Pope’s critique reveals his concern with the 
downplaying of mysterious truths whatever the source of such disregard. 
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criticism leads a prideful critic—who fails to cultivate the integration of his own being, 
prioritizing his reason—to conclude that “All are damn’d beside” (Essay on Criticism 
397). The result of such criticism, Pope concludes, is illumination of only partial truths or 
the distortion of truth: “Meanly they seek the Blessing to confine, / And force that Sun 
but on a Part to Shine” (398-99). Misuse of reason disrupts in man the “blessing” of 
understanding. Even at its full capacity, reason cannot reveal the mysterious aspects of 
truth that are hinted at in Nature and reflected in art. As Pascal argues, “Reason’s last step 
is the recognition that there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it” (qtd. in 
Kreeft 238). Kreeft continues, expounding on Pascal’s idea: “Reason itself tells us that 
God transcends reason” (239). Reason can recognize the existence of paradox but cannot 
describe how paradox works. Gene Edward Veith defines paradox as “a statement that 
contains two apparently contradictory ideas, both of which taken together are true” (137). 
Just as antithesis juxtaposes two ideas without conflating them, man’s reason can grasp 
contradictory ideas and accept both as true. But the relationship between the two ideas 
remains outside the grasp of reason. Antithesis, like paradox, systemizes contradictory 
ideas, making them evident to human reason without diminishing the mystery that 
underlies them. In his artistry, Pope both safeguards and hints at mystery. 
Pope’s recognition of mystery influenced his gardening design. One significant 
manifestation of mystery in Pope’s garden was the hermitage. Hunt has pointed out that 
the hermitage and the suggestion of a hermit were significant in eighteenth-century 
landscape gardens (Figure in the Landscape 58-59). Rooted in classical tradition, a 
hermitage ultimately stood as the guardian of mystery. Pope’s grotto, where he spent 
much time in solitude, working to the sound of flowing water, was initially a necessity, 
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for it connected the grassy stretch between his house and the river Thames to his garden, 
which was on the other side of the road. But it soon became one of the dearest places in 
the garden for Pope. Like the grottoes in the gardens of many of his contemporaries, it 
served a double function as both hermitage and nymphaeum, a “natural cave with a 
spring,” which, in classical tradition, was home to nymphs and the Muses. Pope referred 
to himself as “the hermit of Twickenham” and William Kent, in his sketches of the 
garden at Twickenham, drew Pope ensconced in his grotto (Hunt, “What’s Water” 10). 
Yet Pope also frequently had visitors to his grotto, enjoying the exchange of ideas with 
them as they shared in the beauty and the seclusion. Pope’s response to Fortescue in The 
First Satire of the Second Book of Horace Imitated (1733), Hunt notes, reveals Pope’s 
delight in the solitude as well as the quiet community his grotto provided him:  
  Know, all the distant din that world can keep  
  Rolls o 'er my grotto, and but soothes my sleep.  
  There, my retreat the best companions grace,  
  Chiefs out of war, and Statesman, out of place.  
  There St John mingles with my friendly bowl,  
  The feast of reason and the flow of soul. (123-28) 
From his grotto, Pope received inspiration from the great minds of his contemporaries 
who visited his garden, and, at the same time, from the Muses, who were “protectors of 
the arts and sciences” (Batey 55) and provided inspiration to an individual artist as he 
traced nameless graces or pursued the genius of a place.  
When a hermit sits in his hermitage, cultivating his soul and preserving spiritual 
mysteries, or an artist sits in his cave, receiving inspiration from the Muses and creating 
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art out of natural elements, each effectively serves his work only if the God-like and 
animal-like elements of his being are properly integrated. Withdrawal, which encourages 
considerable attention to the sensitive soul or the imagination, can, as it did for Belinda 
and Eloisa, diminish the full functioning of mind and body; or, it can do the opposite and 
increase self-knowledge as one accurately perceives and responds to one’s reflection. 
Thus, although the existence of a hermit in a garden hints at the existence of mysterious 
truths, a hermit is not privy to mysteries that are hidden from man; rather, he is 
functioning as is most fitting to his nature and, as a result, is best able to overcome his 
limitations and use reason appropriately. Pope worked on poetry or gardening plans in his 
grotto, revealing truths attainable by reason without attempting to grasp those beyond it. 
Both what he revealed and what he concealed were in accordance with man’s nature, so 
that his expressions of truth at once overcome human weakness and observe human 
limitation. He knew that nameless graces beyond man’s full understanding could be 
hinted at through artistry, but that their full source and end remained hidden.  
Pope believed the atmosphere he cultivated in his grotto and garden provided the 
potential for the greatest development of the private self and in turn enabled visitors to 
best live their public lives. Self-knowledge that entails an acceptance of paradox, in 
Pope’s view, increases one’s sensitivity to mysterious truths. Hunt argues that the 
“conflation of outer and inner worlds is one of the most fascinating achievements of the 
whole landscape movement” (“What’s Water” 7) for the world outside of the garden 
becomes more visible from within the garden, and a full view of the beauties inside a 
garden is intertwined with a perspective of the larger landscape. Further, landscape 
gardeners deliberately cultivated variety and arranged multiple perspectives of a single 
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object and multiple views of the larger landscape in order to reflect the complexity—and 
subjectivity—of the human mind. Pope does not dismiss the significance of subjective 
perceptions, for in his Epistle to Cobham he notes that “the diff’rence is as great between 
/ The optics seeing, as the objects seen” (23-24). But, with his understanding of principles 
drawn from a universal Nature, Pope never believed that subjective perceptions overrode 
the capacity a gardener or an author had to demand certain turns of mind. Even as he 
recognized the interrelation between public and private, a common distinction in the 
eighteenth century, in his grotto as in his garden as a whole, he preserved the boundaries 
between the two rather than conflated them. Hunt describes the “intermediary” role of the 
grotto between the two worlds, even as the views it permitted upheld the distinctions 
between the two: 
Between the ever-moving river with its transient scenes and figures and 
the garden with its quiet temple, the poet in his cave—whatever that cave 
may have represented to him—was intermediary. On the garden side, he 
had assembled all the instruments and emblems of the life of 
contemplation . . .. On the other side lay the traffic of the river, the great 
world seen in a passing show (Figure in the Landscape 50-51). 
Pope describes the view from his grotto in a letter to Edward Blount in June 1725: “From 
the River Thames, you see thro’ my arch up a walk of the wilderness to a kind of open 
temple, wholly composed of shells in the rustic manner; and from that distance under the 
Temple you look down thro’ a sloping arcade of trees, and see the sails on the river 
passing suddenly and vanishing, as thro’ a perspective glass” (Sherburn II.296). The 
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grotto provides a glimpse of both the private garden and public riverbank. Its function 
was to unite them, but the contrasting images remained distinct.  
Ultimately, Pope recognized, an individual is effective publicly only if his 
passions are rightly ordered with his reason and if both are in proper relationship to his 
soul; in turn, the outer space of the grotto helps him to order his inner life rightly. The 
design of Pope’s grotto cultivated this wholeness in its visitors and in Pope himself, 
permitting a “feast of reason” and a “flow of soul,” most significantly through the use of 
water. Water, Hunt notes, is from Neoplatonism onward “identified as the emblem of the 
soul in generation, the spiritually active and manifest through the natural world” 
(“What’s Water” 4). The soul, as we have seen, enables man to maintain a proper 
relationship between his two natures. Functioning much like the soul, the water in Pope’s 
cave both calmed and stimulated the mind: it prevented over-activity unfitting to man’s 
nature but also provided diversity to keep the mind of the viewer engaged. In the letter to 
Edward Blount, Pope describes the gentle echoes created throughout the grotto: “I found 
a spring of the clearest water, which falls in a perpetual rill, that echoes thro’ the cavern 
day and night” (Sherburn II.296). Pope frequently spoke of the solace the sound of water 
in the grotto provided him. In 1720, in the early stages of his development of the grotto, 
Pope composed these verses to Lady Montagu:  
What are the falling rills, the pendant Shades, 
The morning Bow’rs, the Evening Colonnades? 
But soft Recesses for th’ uneasy mind. 
To sigh un-heard in, to the passing Wind. (2.142) 
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Even as it provided a sanctuary, the water in the grotto also displayed Pope’s ability to 
trace the Genius of the Place and cultivate creativity. The 1748 visitor to Pope’s garden 
describes the “Diversity of Purposes” to which the “Spring of Water is distributed”: Here 
it gurgles in a gushing Rill thro’ fractur’d Ores and Flints; there it drips from depending 
Moss and Shells; here again, washing Beds of Sand and Pebbles, it rolls in Silver 
Streamlets; and there it rushes out in Jets and Fountains; while the Caverns of the Grot 
incessantly echo with the soothing Murmur of aquatick Sounds” (239). As the 
anonymous visitor continues, he likens the source of Pope’s cultivation of diversity in his 
grotto to the source of the nameless graces in poetry: “supernal Powers and incorporeal 
Beings” who reflect the soul and encourage a response from the God-like aspects of 
man’s being even as creating enjoyment for the animal-like half. He writes,  
To multiply this Diversity, and still more increase the Delight, Mr. Pope’s 
poetick Genius has introduced a kind of Machinery, which performs the 
same Part in the Grotto that the supernal Powers and incorporeal Beings 
act in the heroick Species of Poetry: This is effected by disposing Plates of 
Looking glass in the obscure Parts of the Roof and Sides of the Cave, 
where a sufficient Force of Light is wanting to discover the Deception, 
while the other Parts, the Rills, Fountains, Flints, Pebbles, &c. being duly 
illuminated, are so reflected by the various posited Mirrors, as, without 
exposing the Cause, every Object is multiplied, and its Position 
represented in a surprising Diversity. Cast your eyes upward, and you half 
shudder to see Cataracts of Water precipitating over your Head, from 
impending Stones and Rocks, while salient Spouts rise in rapid Streams at 
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your Feet: Around, you are equally surprised with flowing Rivulets and 
rolling Waters, that rush over airey Precipices, and break amongst Heaps 
of ideal Flints and Spar. Thus, by a fine Taste and happy Management of 
Nature, you are presented with an undistinguishable Mixture of Realities 
and Imagery. (239) 
Pope’s use of water cultivates surprise; its soul-like capacity engages the mind as it 
soothes it, and provides a haven for man’s body as it appeals to his senses. The design of 
the grotto encourages the man who is willing to respond to the beauty around him with 
his whole being. For Pope, the distinction between “Realities” and “Imagery” remained 
crucial, but his artistry accommodated both. The imagery is indicative of mystery; much 
like dressing, it covers even as it accentuates. Realities are magnified so that, even to the 
subjective perception of his viewer, they are more easily recognized. The water follows 
the Genius of the Place, expressing its immaterial presence in the material but not making 
the source itself visible, for it multiplies the diversity of the water “without exposing the 
Cause.” Richard Grave’s description of Pope’s influence on Prior Park reflects a similar 
use of water: “Good use is made of the various rills of water which appear to issue from a 
rock, stricken by the wand of Moses, (a statue of whom is plac’d above it) and trickling 
down the precipice, are collected below into a serpentine river, which is ornamented by a 
fictitious bridge, designed by Mr. Pope, to conceal its termination” (qtd. in Brownell 
210). Pope’s deliberate placement of a bridge conceals the end of the water; his artistry 
again observes human limitations, reflecting the source and end of art but not fully 
revealing symbolically what should remain hidden from man. 
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Pope magnifies the diversity of his water effects partly through the use of mirrors 
and reflections. But unlike the mirror in which Belinda sees herself, these mirrors serve 
not to reflect Pope himself or his visitors themselves and thus do not become more 
subject to a skewed interpretation. Instead, they enlarge the truths outside of man 
suggested by the atmosphere of the cave itself. Pope published Verses on a Grotto by the 
River Thames at Twickenham, composed of Marbles, Spars, and Minerals in The 
Gentleman’s Magazine in January 1741. He writes, 
 Thou who shalt stop, where Thames’ translucent Wave 
 Shines a broad Mirrour thro’ the Shadowy Cave; 
 Where lingering Drops from Mineral Roofs distill, 
 And pointed Crystals break the sparkling Rill, 
 Unpolish’d Gemms no Ray on Pride bestow, 
 And latent Metals innocently glow: 
 Approach. Great NATURE studiously behold! 
 And eye the Mine without a Wish for Gold. 
 Approach: But aweful! Lo th’ Aegerian Grott, 
 Where, nobly-pensive, ST. JOHN sate and thought. (qtd. in Batey 54) 
The mirrors in the “Shadowy Cave” cause “latent Metals”—what is hidden in the 
darkness of the cave—to “innocently glow.” Pope is clear about what sort of response the 
effects of his grotto ought to elicit from visitors, for he says that his “Unpolish’d Gemms 
no Ray on Pride bestow.” Although Pope imported many of his gems, he left them 
unpolished with a rough, natural look. They do not appeal to the superficial taste of those 
who pridefully would impose artifice too greatly on Nature. Rather, Pope insists, visitors 
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should “Approach” full of awe at the glories of Nature that are revealed in his dim cave. 
In the 1725 letter to Edward Blount, after describing the view of the outside world from 
the Grotto, Pope transitions to discuss the view of the inside:  
When you shut the doors of the Grotto, it becomes on the instant, from a 
luminous Room, a Camera obscura; on the Walls of which the objects of 
the River, Hill, Woods, and Boats, are forming a moving picture in their 
visible Radiations: And when you have a mind to light it up, it affords you 
a very different Scene; it is finished with Shells interspersed with Pieces of 
Looking-glass in angular forms; and in the Cieling is a Star of the same 
Material, at which when a Lamp (of an orbicular Figure of thin Alabaster) 
is hung in the Middle, a thousand pointed Rays glitter and are reflected 
over the Place. (Sherburn II.296-97) 
When he closed the door of his Grotto, Pope could withdraw entirely inward. He could 
attend to his own soul or misuse his imagination, serving it rather than relying on it to 
cultivate unity in his being as he observed the mysteries that surround him. The mirrors 
observed man’s limitations and indicated a strong relationship between beauty and 
mystery. A hermit—like any individual, Pope believed—best attains self-knowledge in 
the context of larger truths outside of himself. Such truths are often paradoxical, outside 
the reach of reason, and remain mysterious to man.  
Pope uses antitheses in his poetry to present contrasting ideas in much the same 
way the succession of scenes in a garden juxtaposes contrasts. When Pope places 
antithetical terms in a state of tension, he assumes the existence of a transcendent 
standard and depicts truth that neither term can reflect on its own; such a standard is the 
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source, test, and end of art, and, while reason can reveal to man that such a standard 
exists, it is ultimately beyond man’s purely rational comprehension. A fully-integrated 
man, who cultivates a productive tension between his reason and passions, between his 
mind and body, and between his private and public life, is best able to pursue truth, for he 
does not diminish mystery in his quest to grasp it. In both his life and his art, he cultivates 
the tension rather than seeking to diminish it. The antitheses in Pope’s poetry are “not 
artificial,” as Chesterton argues, for they reflect the “element of paradox [that] runs 
through the whole of existence itself” (“Art of Satire” 583). The form of Pope’s poetry, 
he believed, enabled him to snatch a “Grace beyond the Reach of Art.” Antitheses in 
creation are reflective of man’s nature and traceable by man; paradoxes are best 
understood by men with an accurate self-understanding. The order in variety that Pope 
affirms, the harmony he upholds through tension, and the nameless graces he depicts in 
his poetry and garden are all indicative of his understanding of mystery—of transcendent 
truths beyond man’s understanding but not beyond his recognition.  
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